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INALIENABLE CITIZENSHIP*
IRINA D. MANTA** & CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON***
Over the last decade, citizenship in the United States has become increasingly
precarious. Denaturalization cases increased under President Obama and
skyrocketed under President Trump. No number of years spent in the United
States protects individuals against sudden accusations that they procured
citizenship fraudulently or were never eligible for citizenship in the first place.
Moreover, the government has challenged the citizenship status even of some
individuals—largely from ethnic and religious minority communities—that the
government had previously recognized as citizens for decades.
If the U.S. justice system is committed to the values of reliance and finality, how
can it permit citizenship to be challenged without any time limit? American
courts currently do not recognize a statute of limitations for civil
denaturalization or apply the traditional doctrines of equitable estoppel or laches
to this context. This state of affairs is partly based on judicial misunderstanding
of the property-like features of citizenship and of the punitive nature of removing
it. We argue that this must change. Denaturalization and citizenship denial
undermine the foundation of our democratic system by tolerating second-class
citizenship and promoting chilling effects against free speech and political
participation. The time has come for the legislative and judicial branches to
recognize that delayed citizenship challenges violate constitutional due-process
protections. Security of citizenship is an essential bedrock of our constitutional
order.
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INTRODUCTION
A Latino U.S. military member born in Texas was granted a high-level
security clearance available only to U.S. citizens but was then denied a U.S.
passport because officials doubted the veracity of his birth certificate.1 A white
woman born in a Kansas farmhouse in the 1970s was also denied a U.S. passport,
and that decision was only rescinded when a U.S. senator intervened on her
behalf.2 A young woman born in the United States had no trouble obtaining a
U.S. passport, but then found her citizenship challenged after she traveled
abroad to marry an ISIS fighter.3 A mentally ill U.S. citizen of Puerto Rican
descent was apprehended by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) and deported to South America, where he remained for months and
experienced abuse.4 A fourteen-year-old Texan runaway was deported to
1. Brandon Stahl, Minnesota Man and Marine Vet Born in U.S. Files Legal Challenge to Passport
Denial, STARTRIBUNE (May 9, 2019, 10:42 PM), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-man-bornin-u-s-files-legal-challenge-to-passport-denial/509719882/ [https://perma.cc/L5GQ-UZ9R].
2. Kansas Woman Told Birth Certificate Wasn’t Enough To Prove Citizenship for Passport,
KCTV5 NEWS (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.kctv5.com/news/kansas-woman-told-birth-certificatewasn-t-enough-to-prove/article_144c19aa-b50f-11e8-94f5-6b921312a97a.html [https://perma.cc/J95W
-9RAN] [hereinafter Birth Certificate Wasn’t Enough To Prove Citizenship].
3. Charlie Savage, American-Born Woman Who Joined ISIS Is Not a Citizen, Judge Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/14/us/hoda-muthana-isis-citizenship.html
[https://perma.cc/9NVG-79V2 (dark archive)]; see Muthana v. Pompeo, No. 19-445(RBW), 2019 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 218098, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2019).
4. See Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1269 (M.D. Ga. 2012) (indicating that ICE
agents initiated removal proceedings against the plaintiff following a charge for misdemeanor assault).
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Colombia (in spite of having no ties to the country or familial connection to it)
when the false name she provided to police matched that of a Colombian
citizen.5
All of these cases share a common theme: precarity of citizenship rights.
The individuals in each of these cases had long been recognized as U.S. citizens
and had exercised their citizenship rights in various ways—through voting,
employment, travel on a U.S. passport, and even through service in the military.
They had been recognized as U.S. citizens by their communities. But in each of
these cases, their citizenship was later challenged by the U.S. government, and
rights that they had previously taken for granted—the right to return to or
remain in the United States, the right to obtain a passport, the right to vote—
were suddenly denied or placed at risk.
Citizenship is growing increasingly precarious. This is perhaps most
clearly demonstrated by the government’s denaturalization efforts.
Denaturalization can be a remedy for criminal naturalization fraud.6 But the
government can also file a civil action seeking to strip citizenship even where
there is no allegation of criminal conduct.7 In the nearly fifty years between
1967 and 2013, fewer than 150 individuals were stripped of citizenship in total.8
These numbers increased under the Obama administration, and skyrocketed
under the Trump administration.9 Since January 2017, the start of the Trump
administration, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)
agency “identified approximately 2,500 cases to be examined for possible
denaturalization and referred at least 110 denaturalization cases to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for prosecution by the end of August 2018.”10 In
a 2019 budget request, the DOJ reported that the number of cases referred for
denaturalization proceedings had increased from approximately thirty a year to
an estimated 324 cases for fiscal year 2019, and that the unit had reached
“maximum capacity” for its ability to litigate denaturalization cases.11 Thus, in
2019, the number of expected denaturalization cases in a single year was more

5. Turner v. United States, No. 4:13-cv-932, 2013 WL 5877358, at *1–2 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 31,
2013).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(e); see Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, (Un)Civil
Denaturalization, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 402, 407 (2019) [hereinafter (Un)Civil Denaturalization].
7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).
8. See PATRICK WEIL, THE SOVEREIGN CITIZEN: DENATURALIZATION AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 179–80 (2013).
9. Fact Sheet on Denaturalization, NAT’L IMMIGR. F. (Oct. 2, 2018),
https://immigrationforum.org/article/fact-sheet-on-denaturalization/ [https://perma.cc/2FAF-JZL7].
10. Id.
11. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIV. DIV., FY 2020 BUDGET & PERFORMANCE PLANS 26 (2019),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6789088-2019-Budget-Documents-Civil-Division.html#
document/p30/a553738 [https://perma.cc/H56D-WU9U].
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than double the number of people denaturalized over the fifty years prior—a
stunning increase.12
This is a change driven by politics, not by law.13 Legally, the Supreme
Court has never wavered from a 1967 holding that drastically limited the
government’s ability to take citizenship away. In Afroyim v. Rusk,14 the Court
stated that revocation of citizenship was inconsistent with the original guarantee
of the Constitution, writing that “[i]n our country the people are sovereign and
the Government cannot sever its relationship to the people by taking away their
citizenship.”15 In addition, the Court said that the Fourteenth Amendment went
even further: “Though the framers of the Amendment were not particularly
concerned with the problem of expatriation, it seems undeniable from the
language they used that they wanted to put citizenship beyond the power of any
governmental unit to destroy.”16
These statements seem to preclude today’s denaturalization efforts. But
the Supreme Court left open a loophole, found only in a footnote: “Of
course . . . naturalization unlawfully procured can be set aside.”17 For sixty years,
the opening left by this footnote was used only sparingly. Its most notable use
was as a mechanism to bring escaped Nazi war criminals to justice.18 But now, a
shift in the political environment has caused what was once a minor loophole to
play a central role in the government’s policy objectives.19 The DOJ created a
new office in February 2020 just to focus on civil denaturalization efforts, and
has set a target of terminating eighty percent of denaturalization cases with a
“favorable resolution”—defined as “anything other than a disposition on the
merits in favor of the defendant” whose citizenship is challenged.20
If the United States was built on the notion that its power derives from
the sovereignty of its citizens, what does it mean for the American government
to remove the very root of that power by removing citizenship—either by
denying that someone ever qualified for naturalization or by rescinding
12. It is, of course, important to note that the relative likelihood of denaturalization for any given
person is still quite low; in 2019 alone, more than 830,000 individuals became naturalized citizens in
the United States. See Number of Service-Wide Forms Fiscal Year to- Date, by Quarter, and Form Status,
Fiscal Year 2019, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/
document/data/Quarterly_All_Forms_FY19Q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9ZU-GWLB].
13. See (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 409–14 (discussing the trends shaping
denaturalization policy).
14. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
15. Id. at 257.
16. Id. at 263.
17. Id. at 267 n.23.
18. (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 403–04 (“Civil actions seeking to strip individuals’
citizenship have been exceedingly rare in the last fifty years. When they occurred, they were often the
product of human rights groups’ efforts to identify former Nazis and war criminals who had used forged
and fraudulent credentials to avoid accountability.”).
19. Id.
20. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CIV. DIV., supra note 11, at 27.
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recognition of native-born status? And more broadly, how can we ensure
equality in our democratic system if some of our citizens can never achieve full
security in their status? A system that relegates some to second-class citizenship
leaves foreign-born, ethnic minority, and politically “undesirable” individuals
at constant risk of losing citizenship rights. Targeting even a small number of
people in such discrete categories creates a profound chilling effect,
discouraging political participation and the exercise of speech and associational
rights—the very activities on which participatory democracy was founded.21
This Article argues that citizenship precarity is inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of the U.S. Constitution. It contends that the loophole
left open by the Court in Afroyim authorizes at most a narrow period in which
citizenship decisions are subject to review or reconsideration. Once a person has
been accepted and acknowledged as a citizen for years or decades, the security
of citizenship is essential to the security of our democratic system. Accepting
this principle does not require an affirmative change in the law; instead, it
necessitates interpreting existing law in light of this fundamental principle. The
law already offers mechanisms promoting finality, including statutes of
limitations, the equitable doctrine of laches, and limited windows for appeal or
reconsideration of judgments. These doctrines can and should be applied to
citizenship determinations.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the meaning of citizenship
in the history of the United States, including the initial rise and fall of political
denaturalization, and analyzes how identity and law come together in
citizenship. Part II scrutinizes modern-day citizenship policy, including the
growing use of denaturalization and citizenship challenges, the gap between
official policy and government practice, and the judiciary’s growing unease with
denaturalization procedures. Part III examines how courts use the doctrine of
substantive due process to decide whether citizenship has been appropriately
rescinded, and it argues that citizenship security is a cornerstone of a healthy
democracy. Part IV examines the legal and constitutional contexts of reliance
and finality in governmental determinations. Part V introduces a shifted model
for when and how the government should be able to—or no longer be able to—
challenge individuals’ U.S. citizenship.
I. THE MEANING OF CITIZENSHIP
What does it mean to be a U.S. citizen? In the twenty-first century,
citizenship is a legal conclusion based on facts of birthplace, parentage, or
naturalization.22 But citizenship has always had additional meanings of
21. See infra Section III.B.
22. See (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 407–08 (explaining how denaturalization fits
within citizenship law); Cassandra Burke Robertson & Irina D. Manta, Litigating Citizenship, 73 VAND.
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belonging, allegiance, and identity. Professor Ming Hsu Chen describes two
dimensions of citizenship: a formal dimension that “permits an individual to
attain naturalized citizenship and state-conferred rights and benefits,” and a
substantive dimension that “consists of more informal claims to social
belonging.”23 In the early days of this country, the substantive aspects of
citizenship had even greater legal import than the formal facts of birth,
parentage, or official naturalization proceedings.24 Even as the country’s
bureaucracy grew and the formal aspects of citizenship became paramount,
these additional substantive meanings of citizenship continued to play a
significant role in both sociological identity and legal interpretation, leading to
an increased politicization of citizenship law.25
This part examines the meaning of citizenship in American life. It looks
first at how the idea of citizenship was conceived by the founders of the country
and by the later framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. It then examines how
the expectations surrounding citizenship evolved as citizenship determinations
grew more formalized and citizenship was increasingly wielded as a political
tool. Finally, this part considers the social psychology of citizenship, examining
how legal and social forces combine to shape individuals’ civic identity.
A.

Citizenship in America’s First Century

It is something of a strange conundrum that citizenship, an idea so central
to the creation of the United States and its constitutional order, remained
largely undefined in the founding era. Professor Josh Blackman traced the
meaning of citizenship during the years between the Declaration of
Independence in 1776 (which first articulated the idea of U.S. citizenship) and
the Constitution, which became effective in 1789 and outlined citizenship
requirements for individuals to serve as representatives, senators, or president.26
The creation of the United States followed the formation of a new theory of
citizenship at odds with the notions that existed under English monarchy. In
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Lord Coke’s opinion set out the
English theory of citizenship under the monarchy, holding that “a person’s
L. REV. 757, 766–67 (2020) [hereinafter Litigating Citizenship] (describing contemporary citizenship
disputes).
23. MING HSU CHEN, PURSUING CITIZENSHIP IN THE ENFORCEMENT ERA 5 (2020); see also
MICHAEL KAGAN, THE BATTLE TO STAY IN AMERICA: IMMIGRATION’S HIDDEN FRONT LINE 2–
3 (2020) (recounting a conversation between the author and his young adopted daughter where he
explained that he viewed her citizenship certificate as “a certificate of welcome, a gesture of inclusion,
[and] a form of protection” that “mean[t] that she [wa]s American, and that[] [was] final,” but that his
daughter grew anxious after hearing anti-immigrant political rhetoric and worried that “at a far more
fundamental level, being welcomed in America might be provisional”).
24. See infra Section I.A.
25. See infra Sections I.B–C.
26. Josh Blackman, Original Citizenship, 159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 95, 95 (2010).
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birthright subjectship was immutable, perpetual, and could not be
abandoned.”27 Under the Declaration of Independence, however, the United
States threw off its subjectship—an idea utterly at odds with Lord Coke’s
view.28 The founders of the United States subscribed to a new view of
citizenship derived from John Locke’s idea of a social contract: Government got
its legitimacy from the consent of the people. Individuals could revoke their
consent and give up citizenship; likewise, society could revoke its consent and
set up a new government when circumstances warranted.29
How did people become U.S. citizens in the founding era? It was not just
a matter of living in the states at the end of the Revolutionary War. Instead,
individuals had a choice: they could maintain allegiance to England and leave
the United States after a reasonable time, or they could elect to become citizens
of the new Republic.30 This option became important when individuals were
charged for their conduct assisting England in the revolutionary years.31 If they
were citizens of the United States, their conduct amounted to treason. But if
they were subjects of England, they could not be convicted of treason.32
Early courts, including ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court, adopted the
theory of “citizenship by election,” deferring to individual choice. Courts were
well aware of the potentially troubling incentives created by a rule that allowed
individuals to make such a choice; in the words of Pennsylvania Chief Justice
Thomas McKean, “[t]his construction, it may be said, is favorable to traitors,
and tends to the prejudice of the Commonwealth.”33 Individuals could claim
citizenship for purely instrumental purposes, regardless of their true loyalties.
Traitors could escape prosecution by claiming a false loyalty to England, even
if they were only motivated by financial gain and not by any sense of political
allegiance. Nonetheless, the court weighed these concerns and decided that it
was “better to err on the side of mercy, than of strict justice.”34
While the Declaration of Independence and the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution both shaped the original understanding of citizenship in the
United States, the third major foundation of U.S. citizenship came from the
end of the Civil War and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
27. Id. at 103 (citing Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (KB)).
28. Id. at 113; DAVID RAMSAY, A DISSERTATION ON THE MANNER OF ACQUIRING THE
CHARACTER AND PRIVILEGES OF A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1789) (“The principle of
government being radically changed by the revolution, the political character of the people was also
changed from subjects to citizens. The difference is immense.”).
29. Blackman, supra note 26, at 105–07; see also JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 149–50 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ.
Press 2003) (1690) (setting out the social contract theory of citizenship).
30. Blackman, supra note 26, at 113–16.
31. See id.
32. Id. at 114–15.
33. Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53, 59 (Pa. 1781).
34. Id. at 60.
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shifted America’s understanding of citizenship once again. Most importantly,
of course, the Fourteenth Amendment provided that individuals formerly held
in slavery would now be equal citizens under the Constitution.35 The
amendment states: “All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside.”36 With the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the concept of birthright citizenship became constitutionally enshrined. The
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark37 held that although
Congress retained the power to adopt eligibility requirements for
naturalization, individuals who did not meet those requirements would now be
eligible for citizenship as long as they were born on American soil.38
While Congress’s limitations on naturalization eligibility could not
override the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of birthright citizenship,
Congress still possessed considerable power to establish the substantive
requirements for naturalization and the procedural mechanisms by which to
accomplish it. Congress passed laws setting out naturalization requirements
shortly after ratification of the Constitution. The first law, adopted in 1790,
allowed the courts of any common-law jurisdiction in the United States to grant
naturalization, meaning that over 5,000 courts could grant citizenship.39 At this
time, there was no statutory basis for denaturalization. Nonetheless, courts
possessed inherent authority over their own judgments, and it was accepted that
“a court which had issued a certificate of citizenship had the power to cancel it
upon a showing by a proper party that the certificate had been procured through
fraud.”40
35. See Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 4 (1977) (“The substantive core of the amendment, and of the equal protection clause in
particular, is a principle of equal citizenship, which presumptively guarantees to each individual the
right to be treated by the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating member.”).
This constitutional guarantee of equal citizenship, of course, was not borne out in law or practice;
though progress has been made over the decades, the struggle for full recognition of equal citizenship
remains ongoing. See, e.g., Ayesha Bell Hardaway, The Supreme Court and the Illegitimacy of Lawless
Fourth Amendment Policing, 100 B.U. L. REV. 1193, 1195 (2020) (“Historical documentation of local law
enforcement attacks on Black communities extend back to the American Reconstruction. The American
legal system—both state and federal—has largely failed to address the issue.”); Christina Swarns, “I
Can’t Breathe!”: A Century Old Call for Justice, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 1021, 1028 (2016) (“‘I Can’t
Breathe’ must be understood as a poignant articulation of how generations of racialized violence—
particularly by law enforcement—has impaired the American criminal justice system.”).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
37. 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
38. Id. at 699 (“The acts of congress, known as the Chinese Exclusion Acts, the earliest of which
was passed some fourteen years after the adoption of the Constitutional Amendment, cannot control
its meaning, or impair its effect, but must be construed and executed in subordination to its
provisions.”).
39. WEIL, supra note 8, at 18.
40. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Denied in Denaturalization Proceeding, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
424, 425 n.11 (1957) [hereinafter Self-Incrimination Denied].
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Naturalization fraud existed perhaps as long as naturalization itself and
often originated in corrupt government actors.41 From an early time, people
recognized that naturalization created both financial and political incentives for
government actors and entities.42 The financial incentives came from the court
fees charged for naturalization, which turned into a significant source of revenue
for many state courts.43 The political incentives came from the ability of
naturalization to create new pools of voters, a draw so strong that the Tammany
Hall political machine in New York City induced 41,112 naturalizations just
prior to the election of 1868—a vast increase over the 9,205 naturalizations
occurring between 1856 and 1867.44
Denaturalization existed during this period, but it was relatively rare and
not standardized.45 There was (and still is) no federal registry of citizens. All
common-law courts, whether state or federal, had the power to naturalize; they
“gave no notice of the filing of applications, and were not required to make
reports of any kind.”46 But denaturalization existed as part of the general power
that courts had over their dockets. One judge wrote that “any court before
whom such proceedings take place may, on the ground of fraud, mistake, or
irregularity, vacate its own orders or decrees,” but required that such action be
undertaken as any other judgment would be reviewed, specifying that such
review be conducted through the court’s “inherent power to correct or annul its
judgments or decrees by petition, bill of review, or other similar and equivalent
method of procedure.”47
However, there were limits to the courts’ inherent power to undo
naturalization. A citizenship challenge reached the Supreme Court in 1830.48
The case involved a will contest—the challengers argued that the testator had
obtained his citizenship by fraud.49 If the testator were not a citizen, he would
lack the power to bequeath his property. Chief Justice John Marshall applied
equitable principles, focusing on the reliance interest, in concluding that
naturalization should not be subject to a collateral attack.50 He acknowledged
that forbidding a collateral attack on naturalizations would create
“inconvenience,” but concluded that allowing such attacks would cause “still
41. WEIL, supra note 8, at 15 (explaining that “naturalization was a tool for political machines to
increase the number of loyal voters on the eve of local, state, and federal elections”).
42. Id. (noting that naturalization gave access to jobs reserved for U.S. citizens).
43. Id. at 18.
44. Arthur John Keeffe & Morton Moskin, Pre-Statutory Denaturalization, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 120,
126 (1949).
45. Id. at 121.
46. Id. at 122.
47. United States v. Norsch, 42 F. 417, 417 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1890).
48. Spratt v. Spratt, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 393, 393 (1830); see also Keeffe & Moskin, supra note 44, at
124 (discussing the case).
49. Spratt, 29 U.S. at 405.
50. Id. at 408.
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greater” inconvenience and indeed “great mischief, if, after the acquisition of
property on the faith of his certificate, an individual might be exposed to the
disabilities of an alien, on account of an error in the court, not apparent on the
record of his admission.”51 The Court unanimously held the testator to be a
citizen.52 This may be the first recognition in U.S. law that the harm arising
from upsetting settled expectations of citizenship was greater than the harm of
continuing to recognize citizenship granted in error. In this way, the Court
recognized that citizenship rights were fundamental to the constitutional order
and demonstrated a willingness to protect those rights from interference by the
political branches of government.
B.

Denaturalization and the Politicization of Citizenship

As the nineteenth century drew to a close and the twentieth century
dawned, political issues surrounding citizenship and denaturalization increased.
It was not unusual for denaturalization to be “used as a political weapon in order
to decrease the opposition’s eligible voters before election.”53 From the very
beginning, denaturalization was rooted in political opportunism rather than
legal principle. In one notable case from 1912, an enterprising political candidate
used citizenship as a weapon in the race for the office of supervisor of Kline
township in Pennsylvania.54 One candidate sought a court declaration that his
opponent’s father, Calogero Macoluso, had fraudulently obtained citizenship,
and that his opponent, John Macoluso (who was born in Italy but immigrated
to the United States as a child), was therefore ineligible to hold office, as John
held derivative citizenship based on his father’s naturalization.55 The court did
not consider the Supreme Court’s 1830 ruling warning against collateral attacks
on naturalization;56 it is possible that no one brought it to the court’s attention.
At any rate, the Pennsylvania court held that the citizenship challenge could
proceed.57 The elder Calogero was no longer alive to contest the proceeding,
and his naturalization certificate had never been challenged in his lifetime.58
The naturalization certificate had, in fact, been accepted as valid for years, and
allowed Calogero’s son John to be recognized as a citizen and to vote for years
after reaching adulthood.59 Nonetheless, the court concluded that Calogero’s

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Self-Incrimination Denied, supra note 40, at 425 n.11.
See In re Macoluso’s Naturalization, 85 A. 149, 149 (Pa. 1912).
Id.
See supra Section I.A.
In re Macoluso’s Naturalization, 85 A. at 151.
See id. at 150.
Id. at 149.
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naturalization certificate was invalid and that John therefore lacked citizenship
and was ineligible to hold the office of county supervisor.60
The citizenship challenge put John in a difficult bind. Prior to the political
challenge, John’s options were significantly limited—during the years in which
the government recognized him as a citizen, he could not have sought
naturalization; only noncitizens can be naturalized.61 And even if the declaratory
judgment procedure was open to him in early twentieth-century Pennsylvania,
there would have been no ground on which to seek a declaration of citizenship
when there was no one contending that his citizenship was invalid. There was
no question that he had relied on his father’s naturalization certificate, and that
the government had relied on it as well, in allowing him to vote in a number of
elections. Until the political challenge, there was no case or controversy. Thus,
if John had not chosen to run for office, it is likely that his citizenship would
never have been challenged at all, and he would have continued to be recognized
as a U.S. citizen. This was an early case where political participation and
political ambitions put citizenship status at risk.
John Macoluso’s case also occurred at a time when the process for both
naturalization and denaturalization was shifting from state to federal authority.
By the early twentieth century, citizenship determination became more
formalized. The Naturalization Act of 1906 created the first federal registry of
naturalized citizens.62 The Act introduced formal denaturalization proceedings
and, for the first time, denaturalization was not limited to the courts’ inherent
power to undo judgments.63 But the federalization of citizenship did not remove
politics from the process. For the first time since the founding, political beliefs
(like anarchism) and lifestyle (like polygamy) could exclude someone from
citizenship.64
Interestingly, Congressional action on denaturalization was not primarily
a reaction to the earlier voting-fraud cases. By the twentieth century, laws
surrounding ballot secrecy had reduced the political machines’ ability to strong60. Id. at 150.
61. See 8 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 301.9-3 (2021),
https://fam.state.gov/FAM/08FAM/08FAM030109.html [https://perma.cc/RGR2-YN3T]; 8 U.S.C.
§ 1427(a), (f)(3) (describing processes for the naturalization of “aliens” and requiring their being
“lawfully admitted for permanent residence” prior to naturalization).
62. Naturalization Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596 (repealed 1940).
63. See Kritika Agarwal, Stripping Naturalized Immigrants of Their Citizenship Isn’t New,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (July 24, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/strippingnaturalized-immigrants-their-citizenship-isnt-new-180969733/ [https://perma.cc/8DV7-LQ44] (“The
Naturalization Act of 1906 was the first law in U.S. history that provided for denaturalization.”). Prior
to 1906, state courts controlled the naturalization process, and naturalization decisions were court
judgments subject to reversal only through the limited mechanisms of the civil justice system, primarily
by appeal. Loss of citizenship was therefore rare, with only a few cases reported. Id.
64. See id.; Aram A. Gavoor & Daniel Miktus, Snap: How the Moral Elasticity of the
Denaturalization Statute Goes Too Far, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 637, 650 (2015).

99 N.C. L. REV. 1425 (2021)

1436

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

arm newly naturalized citizens into voting—there was simply no guarantee they
would vote the “right” way.65 And although people decried the naturalization
fraud related to elections, sentiments were not strong enough to spur legislative
action. After all, naturalization fraud was a game played by both sides, and there
were other reforms targeted at reducing the power of machine politics.
Racism, on the other hand, played a bigger role in influencing citizenship
legislation. An earlier bill proposing naturalization reform had stalled when
members of Congress got sidetracked by debating whether individuals of Asian
descent could be eligible for citizenship. Debate on the bill devolved into a
discussion that “was largely composed of anthropological exchanges between
the egalitarian [Senator] Sumner [who proposed extending naturalization rights
regardless of race], and the western racists.”66 By the time the 1906 Act passed,
there was growing concern in Congress that the number of “nordic” immigrants
from northern and western Europe were now outnumbered by immigrants from
eastern Europe and the Mediterranean—a fact that influenced political demand
“for ending our easy naturalization policy and cracking down on those who had
obtained naturalization in violation of the laws.”67
In the decades following, denaturalization efforts increased and all three
of the branches of government took actions that caused people to lose their
American citizenship. Congress adopted laws taking away citizenship from
American women who married foreign men,68 from individuals who voted in
foreign elections or served in the armed forces of another country, and from
members of the U.S. military who deserted their posts in wartime.69 In the
executive branch, during World War II, the DOJ “targeted members of the
German-American Bund for denaturalization,” arguing that Bund members
lacked sufficient attachment to the U.S. Constitution.70 And although the
political branches were the primary drivers of citizenship revocation, the
judicial branch played a role as well; when the Supreme Court ruled in 1923
that individuals from India were racially ineligible for citizenship, dozens of
65. Keeffe & Moskin, supra note 44, at 133.
66. Id. at 129.
67. Id. at 133.
68. Expatriation Act of 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-193, § 3, 34 Stat. 1228, 1228–29 (repealed 1922).
69. (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 440–41 (discussing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
87 (1958)). It is noteworthy that some of these statutes stripped citizenship not just through
denaturalization (affecting naturalized citizens) but also through the expatriation of natural-born
citizens.
70. Agarwal, supra note 63; see also Esther Rosenfeld, Fatal Lessons: United States Immigration Law
During the Holocaust, 1 U. CAL. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 249, 262 (1995) (“The Nazi Ministry of
Propaganda directed the German-American Bund, which claimed a membership of 25,000. This
organization operated twenty-four retreat camps across the United States, distributed thousands of
pamphlets, sponsored a daily national radio program, and staged huge ‘patriotic’ rallies. Via the
German-American press, the Bund tried to frustrate policies which it considered prejudicial to
Germany, including all proposals for harboring German refugees.”).
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naturalized citizens—and, in some cases, their American-born wives—had their
U.S. citizenship taken away from them.71
These actions added up. In the six decades between 1907 and 1967, the
government revoked the citizenship of more than 22,000 Americans.72
Moreover, facially neutral citizenship laws were, at times, applied vindictively
as political punishment. In 1918, as part of the effort to fight communism, the
U.S. government denaturalized and deported radical anarchist Emma Goldman
by denaturalizing her ex-husband (causing Goldman, a woman, to lose
citizenship because it had been derived from and was dependent on his).73
During the 1940s, the government increased its use of denaturalization, in
particular against perceived Nazi sympathizers.74 The 1940 Nationality Act
newly allowed denaturalization for working in some foreign government
positions, voting in other countries’ elections, or (in the case of children)
spending six months or more in a country of which their parents were citizens.75
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 also enacted provisions to permit
denaturalization of those who engage in “subversive activities.”76
As America’s second century advanced into its third, both the law and
politics surrounding denaturalization shifted. In a series of holdings beginning
in the 1940s, the Supreme Court increasingly protected the institution of
citizenship, requiring heightened due-process protections when citizenship was
challenged.77 In 1967, the Court took an important step further, holding in
Afroyim v. Rusk that individuals could no longer be deprived of their citizenship
involuntarily; only people who affirmatively chose to give up citizenship could
have it taken away.78 The Court warned that “[t]he very nature of our free
government makes it completely incongruous to have a rule of law under which
a group of citizens temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens

71. See Agarwal, supra note 63; United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 213–15
(1923).
72. WEIL, supra note 8, at 179.
73. Id. at 63; see also AMANDA FROST, YOU ARE NOT AMERICAN 149 (2021) (“No matter that
Kersner’s citizenship had been certified by a court, that the errors in the timing of the citizenship
application were apparently inadvertent, or that he had been a US citizen for the past twenty-four
years. Kersner would be collateral damage in the government’s quest to denaturalize and deport his
former wife.”).
74. See, e.g., WEIL, supra note 8, at 93.
75. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, §§ 401–402, 54 Stat. 1168–69 (repealed 1952).
76. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 340, 66 Stat. 163, 260–63 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–
1537) (stating that subversive activities include concealment of a material fact, membership in certain
organizations, and foreign residence).
77. Litigating Citizenship, supra note 22, at 779–80.
78. See 387 U.S. 253, 266–67 (1967). In a footnote, the Court exempted cases of citizenship fraud.
Id. at 267 n.23.
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of their citizenship,”79 although it qualified this statement in a footnote by
saying that “naturalization unlawfully procured can be set aside.”80
After Afroyim, denaturalization became exceedingly rare. It was not just
that the law had changed—the politics had changed as well. As the Cold War
went on, the United States increasingly defined itself by its due-process
protections and welcome to new citizens; a “papers please” mentality was for
communist and totalitarian systems, not for U.S. citizens.81 The Supreme
Court’s increasingly protective holdings combined with a changing political
landscape to vastly reduce the number of denaturalization cases pursued by the
government.82 In the late 1990s, there was briefly renewed interest in
denaturalization when the executive branch, under President Bill Clinton, tried
to create administrative procedures for denaturalization.83 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit put an end to this effort when it ruled that while
Congress had delegated naturalization powers to the Attorney General, it had
not done so for denaturalization authority.84 The entire period of 1968 to 2018
saw only four denaturalization cases reach the Supreme Court.85 Indeed, even
the period after 9/11 did not involve a spike after leaders of both political parties
opposed proposals to use denaturalization in the fight against terrorism.86 Thus,
the Supreme Court’s protection of citizenship rights put at least a half-century
lull in the political branches’ gamesmanship surrounding denaturalization.
C.

Citizenship and Identity

The prior two sections examined the law and politics of citizenship in the
United States. This section considers the third leg of the stool: the individual
and social identities tied to citizenship. Identity has played a role in citizenship
law from the founding—after all, in the very first citizenship cases, the operative
legal question was whether the individual self-identified as an English subject

79. Id. at 268.
80. Id. at 267 n.23.
81. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Due Process in the American Identity, 64 ALA. L. REV. 255, 262
(2012) [hereinafter American Identity] (“[D]uring both the Cold War and the civil rights struggle of the
twentieth century . . . judicial rhetoric contrasted our democratic judicial procedures with the arbitrary
use of power associated with communist and totalitarian regimes.”); Thomas L. Knapp, Are Your Papers
in Order?, CTR. FOR STATELESS SOC’Y (June 2, 2009), http://c4ss.org/content/605
[https://perma.cc/CK68-UHUN] (“There was a time—in living memory, even—when the roadblock,
the vehicle or personal search, and the demand for ‘your papers, please’ were the height of Cold War
cliché. If you saw them on a film screen or read them in a potboiler novel, . . . you knew the protagonists
were traveling in Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, or a troubled, war-torn Third World dictatorship.”).
82. See WEIL, supra note 8, at 139, 178–80 (noting that the government mostly focused on highprofile cases after that point).
83. See 8 C.F.R. § 340.1 (2020).
84. See Gorbach v. Reno, 219 F.3d 1087, 1089, 1097 (9th Cir. 2000).
85. See (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 429–30.
86. Id.
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or an American citizen.87 As Professor Harold Hongju Koh writes, “national
identities are not givens, but rather, socially constructed products of learning,
knowledge, cultural practices, and ideology.”88
Research from social psychology helps to explain how identity informs our
understanding of citizenship and how people engage in activities related to
citizenship, such as civic participation.89 Individuals have both social identities
and role identities.90 Social identities answer the questions: who is “us” and who
is “them”?91 Each person has multiple social identities, some more salient than
others, in ways that are different for each individual. Thus, for example, some
individuals have a stronger social identity based on statehood, racial, ethnic, or
religious background,92 or political affiliation.93 Individuals engage in cognitive
framing that reinforces uniformity and enhances group members’ self-esteem.94
People do not need to directly interact to form a social identity; it is
enough to recognize a common “ingroup” that is viewed in opposition to others
who are part of the “outgroup.”95 A group identity might arise from shared
87. See supra notes 28–34 and accompanying text.
88. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 202 (1996).
89. American Identity, supra note 81, at 276 (“Individuals perform an ‘American’ or ‘citizen’ role
identity when they participate in the United States democratic process—for example, by making
decisions about which candidates to support, by debating friends and colleagues about policy choices,
or by answering political polling questions.”); see also Ian Long, Note, “Have You Been an UnAmerican?”: Personal Identification and Americanizing the Noncitizen Self-Concept, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 571,
589 (2008) (“In the field of social psychology, there are two prominent theories used to describe selfconcept and explain how this concept of self is either altered or reinforced by one’s existence within
society.”).
90. American Identity, supra note 81, at 272–76.
91. PETER J. BURKE & JAN E. STETS, IDENTITY THEORY 118–19 (2009); see MICHAEL A.
HOGG & DOMINIC ABRAMS, SOCIAL IDENTIFICATIONS: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP
RELATIONS AND GROUP PROCESSES 172 (1998).
92. Holning Lau, An Introduction to Intragroup Dissent and Its Legal Implications, 89 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 537, 539 (2014) (“[R]acial, ethnic, and religious groups are identity groups because these groups
frequently play a role in shaping people’s self-concept. To be sure, not all individuals feel a strong sense
of membership in racial, ethnic, and religious groups, but these groups have been socially constructed
in such a way that they are often salient to people’s identity.”); Anthony V. Alfieri & Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Next-Generation Civil Rights Lawyers: Race and Representation in the Age of Identity
Performance, 122 YALE L.J. 1484, 1527–28 (2013) (discussing challenges that can arise when AfricanAmerican lawyers share one social identity with clients (race) but not another (class)); Kenneth L.
Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV.
263, 283 (1995) (“As the notions of outing and passing remind us, a person’s interior sense of his or
her own race or sexual orientation may or may not be enacted in public. Yet, public or not, each of
these identities is social, carrying a conventional name that defines someone as a particular kind of
person, a member of one of society’s categories of identity.”).
93. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural
Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 389, 394–95 (2009).
94. See Michael Hogg, Social Identity and Misuse of Power: The Dark Side of Leadership, 70 BROOK.
L. REV. 1239, 1242 (2005) (“Since the groups and categories we belong to furnish us with a social
identity that defines and evaluates who we are, we struggle to promote and protect the distinctiveness
and evaluative positivity of our own group relative to other groups.”).
95. BURKE & STETS, supra note 91, at 118–19; see also HOGG & ABRAMS, supra note 91, at 172.
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characteristics that are outside the individual’s control, such as ethnic
background or similarities in upbringing. However, shared characteristics alone
do not create identity; instead, social identities arise from individuals’ selfcategorization.96 Thus, a person may identify as a Southerner, a Presbyterian, a
Latino, and an American. In recent years, partisan identification (for example,
as a Republican or Democrat) has also become a powerful social identity.97
Role identities arise from the roles that individuals play in society—for
example, one person may have role identities that include attorney, parent,
friend, and committed voter. Role identities affect how people see the world
and influence the actions they take.98 Although role identities operate at the
individual level, they are influenced by context and by the reflected views of
others. When a role identity is externally confirmed—for example, when “a
person with a strong ‘student’ identity receives an A”—it is considered “selfverification.”99 Self-verification “confirm[s] what [people] already believe about
themselves.”100
When people see their self-assessments reflected back at them, they
experience positive emotions. On the other hand, when people receive
feedback at odds with their self-identity—as when a person with a strong
student identity receives a C or D—emotional distress results. The
distress that results from non-self-verifying feedback is greater than the
situation would seem to warrant. Thus, for example, the low grade itself
may be relatively unimportant, as with a grade on a low-stakes
assignment likely to have little bearing on the student’s overall grade in
the course—but because the low grade contradicts the student’s self-

96. See Marilynn Brewer, The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time, in
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 245, 247 (Michael A. Hogg & Dominic Abrams eds., 2001) (“Membership
may be voluntary or imposed, but social identities are chosen. Individuals may recognize that they
belong to any number of social groups without adopting those classifications as social identities.”); see
also John C. Turner, Towards a Cognitive Redefinition of the Social Group, in SOCIAL IDENTITY AND
INTERGROUP RELATIONS 15, 15 (Henri Tajfel ed., 1982) (“[A] social group can be defined as two or
more individuals who share a common social identification of themselves or, which is nearly the same
thing, perceive themselves to be members of the same social category.”); Catherine E. Smith, The
Group Dangers of Race-Based Conspiracies, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 55, 71 (2006) (“The individual chooses
specific ‘social categories’ with which he identifies and places himself . . . .”).
97. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L. REV. 739,
751 (2018) [hereinafter Judicial Impartiality] (“[I]ncreasing political polarization and hardening partisan
attitudes lead to personal and political rifts. Hardening views mean that increasingly people are not
just predisposed to think well of others who share their social identity, but are also predisposed to feel
antipathy toward those who do not.”).
98. Id. at 748.
99. Id.; see BURKE & STETS, supra note 91, at 58–59.
100. Judicial Impartiality, supra note 97, at 748.
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conception, it creates an emotional response similar to a much larger
threat, potentially leading to anger, distress, and depression.101
Citizenship is a part of both social and role identity. Citizenship status
promotes an “American” social identity. And individuals enact an American
role identity when they engage in civic activities—voting, expressing support
for one candidate over another, running for office, or debating policy choices.
The social psychology of citizenship has been closely tied to both law and
politics since the country’s founding. As one scholar noted, “[n]ational
citizenship was the standard legal mechanism that nation-states used to bind
individuals to the polity and to bridge the gap between a categorical conception
of identity and an emotional attachment.”102 Modern citizenship is a legal
category that feeds into individual identity: “Law is constituent of identity . . . .
[It] provides the mechanisms that support institutions and the identities that
they define. Public identities principally include citizenship and work identities,
both institutionally buttressed by the organizations of the modern nation-state
and the market.”103 In 2012, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
highlighted the psychological link to citizenship security, urging new citizens to
“do what I did, and put your citizenship document in the safest and most secure
place you can find,” because the document “represents not just a change in legal
status but a license to a dream.”104
Scholar Peter Callero delved further into identity and democratic
participation.105 His work challenges the assumption that democratic
participation is fully explained by rational-choice theory.106 He found that
“cooperation for the common good is also motivated by role-taking, group
commitments, and altruistic identities.”107 Security of citizenship encourages
such group commitments by strengthening an “American” social identity. And
it encourages cooperative democratic role-taking by allowing the selfverification of an American role-identity, which is enacted by voting and
engaging in other forms of civic participation.108
101. Id. at 748–49; see also Cassandra Burke Robertson, Organizational Management of Conflicting
Professional Identities, 43 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 603, 607–08 (2011).
102. Mabel Berezin, Identity Through a Glass Darkly: Review Essay of Peter J. Burke and Jan E. Stets,
Identity Theory, 73 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 220, 221 (2010).
103. Id.
104. Emily Ryo & Ian Peacock, Denying Citizenship: Immigration Enforcement and Citizenship Rights
in the United States 2 (Univ. of S. Cal. L. Sch., Working Paper No. 307, 2019).
105. Peter L. Callero, Identity and Social Capital: How To Advance Democracy at the Level of
Interaction, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN IDENTITY THEORY AND RESEARCH 75, 76 (Jan E. Stets &
Richard T. Serpe eds., 2016).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 99.
108. See id. at 97 (“[D]eliberative democracy is reformulated in a manner that takes into account
the role of emotion in communication, the significance of small groups, and the fact that identities
structure social interaction, influence perception, and motivate action.”).
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The immigration experience is a story of shifting identities, sometimes
including citizenship itself and sometimes including social or role identities
connected with citizenship. As the individual adapts to life in the United States,
some identities will remain, some may be lost, and some may rise or fall in
salience:
Most immigrants arrive in their destination country with a firm sense of
their national and ethnic identity . . . . Religion may also be a prominent
identity, sometimes closely linked to the national identity . . . . Once the
immigrant is settled in the destination country, a new national identity
becomes an option. Existing identities, such as ethnicity and religion,
often continue to be central to the immigrant, but at the same time, the
meaning and acceptability of those identities may be subject to new
challenges, and new networks of support need to be established. As a
consequence, the immigrant’s identity structure may be redefined in
light of the new conditions, traditions, and norms.109
In some cases, individuals may experience role strain when two identities push
them in different directions. Professors Jessie Finch and Robin Stryker studied
Latino/a attorneys and judges working in immigration proceedings on the
Arizona border as part of Operation Streamline.110 Operation Streamline seeks
to fast-track proceedings for unauthorized border-crossers, and it has been
widely criticized for violating procedural due process.111 In these court
proceedings, defendants would “plead guilty in groups of twenty or more, with
mass waivers of rights followed by individual pleas that took only a few
minutes,” and judges would not consider individual circumstances.112
The lawyers and judges working in these proceedings experienced tension
between values of “formal legality and substantive justice,”113 as well as tension
between their social identity (Latino/a, a social identity shared with their clients
and defendants) and their role identity (lawyer or judge in a summary
proceeding aimed at quickly imposing criminal sanctions).114 In some places,
citizenship played a moderating role, making a national identity more salient

109. Kay Deaux, Immigration and Identity Theory: What Can They Gain from Each Other?, in
IDENTITY AND SYMBOLIC INTERACTION: DEEPENING FOUNDATIONS, BUILDING BRIDGES 273,
280 (Richard T. Serpe, Robin Stryker & Brian Powell eds., 2020).
110. Jessie K. Finch and Robin Stryker, Competing Identity Standards and Managing Identity
Verification, in IDENTITY AND SYMBOLIC INTERACTION: DEEPENING FOUNDATIONS, BUILDING
BRIDGES 119, 119–20 (Richard T. Serpe, Robin Stryker & Brian Powell eds., 2020).
111. Ingrid V. Eagly, The Movement to Decriminalize Border Crossing, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1967, 2002–
03 (2020) (“Scholars repeatedly called attention to the fact that Streamline—often referred to as
‘McJustice’ or ‘Operation Steamroller’—fostered ‘assembly-line justice,’ threatened basic due process
rights, and severely constrained access to counsel.”).
112. Id. at 2002.
113. Finch & Stryker, supra note 110, at 124–27.
114. See id. at 140–42.
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than an ethnic identity.115 For example, one judge described how others
sometimes challenged his participation: “People say, ‘Well how can you do
that?’ Like to me, as a judge, sentence these people to time. I look at them and
I say, ‘I’m an American. The problem is this: you think I’m Mexican.’”116 For
this particular judge, citizenship was the factor which eased the tension he felt
between social identity and role identity.
A social identity based on citizenship could also moderate criticism from
the opposite side of the political sphere. One defense attorney reported:
I always got it from the conservative groups, “Why do you represent
these criminals, these illegals? Why do you help these people out—just
because you’re all Mexicans?” And I tell them “I believe in the
constitution of the United States.” . . . [T]his is probably the most
American thing you can do as a job and I’m very proud of it . . . .117
The attorneys and judges in the Finch & Stryker study managed their
competing identity standards by drawing on their citizenship identity and their
role in facilitating formal justice.118 This was possible because of the
participants’ professional roles in the justice system. In other circumstances,
however, individuals may be pushed away from a strong citizen or civic identity,
rather than drawn toward it, and thus might refrain from political participation.
As a result, citizenship itself could play a role in the individual’s conception of
self, and the meanings associated with the “citizen” identity could also influence
engagement in the civic sphere.
Attacks on citizenship—and political efforts to suggest a relationship
between citizenship and whiteness—can have a negative effect on individuals’
American identity and on their civic participation. Journalist Masha Gessen
writes that naturalization is supposed to be like adoption; “once it has taken
effect, the adopted child is legally indistinguishable from a biological one.”119
Adoption gives one a new family identity, and naturalization a new citizenship
identity. But the formation of such a new identity requires security, and “if one
can be denaturalized, one can never really become a child of America.”120

115. Id. at 142 (“Many Latino/a attorneys and judges participating in Operation Streamline also
deflected threats to non-verification of their social identity by elevating the prominence and salience
of their citizenship-based identity while lessening the prominence and salience of their racial/ethnic
identity.”).
116. Id. at 140.
117. Id. at 141.
118. Id.
119. Masha Gessen, Trump, “Shitholes,” and the Nature of “Us,” NEW YORKER
(Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/trump-shitholes-and-the-nature-ofus [https://perma.cc/6LUU-GTFV (dark archive)].
120. Id.
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Politically scapegoating and dehumanizing immigrants may further
increase the identity tension for immigrants and newly naturalized citizens.121
A study of healthcare-seeking behavior in an immigrant community suggested
that punitive immigration actions can affect citizen behavior.122 It found that
Latino U.S. citizens were less likely to make appointments with healthcare
providers when the government strengthened immigration enforcement.123
Other studies have looked at the connection between punitive immigration
enforcement efforts and the political participation of citizens living in
communities subject to such efforts.124 There is some indication that punitive
immigration activity may spur later political activism: “[M]obilization spurred
by proximal contact is rooted in a politicized group identity and the belief that
punitive immigration policies unfairly target Latinos based on group
affiliation.”125 But there is also indication that the opposite result can occur,
leaving the researchers to open the question for future research: “Is there a
tipping point, whereby excessive exposure to punitive policy yields deep
political alienation?”126 In either case, however, it is clear that citizenship is more
than just a legal status: it is also a fundamental part of individual and social
identity.
II. RECENT CHALLENGES TO CITIZENSHIP
The U.S. government can challenge an individual’s citizenship in multiple
ways. This can entail refusal to recognize citizenship; failure to issue a passport,
permit voting, or allow entry at the border; removal from the country; or
denaturalization on the basis that the person did not meet the statutory
requirements or committed fraud when applying for citizenship.127 Scholars
have categorized citizenship challenges as either “formal denial,” such as
denaturalization or refusal to issue a passport based on an alleged lack of
citizenship, or “effective denial,” involving “state actions that curtail, derogate,

121. Masha Gessen, In America, Naturalized Citizens No Longer Have an Assumption
of Permanence, NEW YORKER (June 18, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/inamerica-naturalized-citizens-no-longer-have-an-assumption-of-permanence [https://perma.cc/4AS5LD8H (dark archive)] (“The President calls immigrants ‘animals.’ The Attorney General presumes
that everyone crossing the border—or at least the southern border—is a criminal.”).
122. Franciso I. Pedraza, Vanessa Cruz Nichols & Alana M.W. LeBrón, Cautious Citizenship: The
Deterring Effect of Immigration Issue Salience on Health Care Use and Bureaucratic Interactions Among Latino
US Citizens, 42 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 925, 925 (2017).
123. Id.
124. Hannah Walker, Marcel Roman & Matt Barreto, The Direct and Indirect Effects of Immigration
Enforcement on Latino Political Engagement, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1818, 1818 (2019).
125. Id. at 1822.
126. Id. at 1841.
127. Litigating Citizenship, supra note 22, at 766–67; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1427 (detailing the
statutory requirements for citizenship).
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or interfere with the exercise of full citizenship rights by certain segments of
the U.S. population.”128
It has been difficult to research the full extent of ongoing citizenship
challenges. We have previously written about the recent growth of both formal
and effective citizenship challenges, examining the increase in denaturalization
cases, denial of previously recognized citizenship rights, and wrongful expulsion
of U.S. citizens as a result of immigration proceedings that failed to offer
meaningful due-process rights.129 There is, however, no central registry of
denaturalization cases, and the government has not been entirely forthcoming
with Freedom of Information Act requests.130 In addition, some
denaturalization cases have been filed under seal, keeping them out of the public
view. The mistaken deportation of U.S. citizens is especially hard to track, as
the very reason for the removal action is the government’s failure to recognize
the person as a citizen—and once deported, noncitizens do not have recognized
rights to petition the government.131 Nonetheless, enough cases have made it
into to the press and into court proceedings that some trends are becoming
visible. This part discusses the recent political challenges to citizenship and the
response of the judicial branch.
A.

The New Politics of Citizenship

Donald Trump made immigration law and policy an essential part of his
political platform when he ran for and ultimately won the U.S. presidency in
2016.132 His plan was to have the government show “zero tolerance” for any

128. Ryo & Peacock, supra note 104, at 10 (explaining that “effective denial” of citizenship rights
would apply to citizen children, who “are not the targets of immigration enforcement action themselves,
but their citizenship rights are substantially curtailed due to enforcement action against their parents”).
129. Litigating Citizenship, supra note 22, at 780–84.
130. Ryo & Peacock, supra note 104, at 18–19 (noting that some information had been made
available through a Freedom of Information Act request, but that “we do not even know how many
cases the USCIS has investigated for denaturalization, on what bases, and how many of those cases
have been referred to the DOJ” and that USCIS has not responded to the first author’s request for
these records).
131. Hillary Gaston Walsh, Unequivocally Different: The Third Civil Standard of Proof, 66 U. KAN.
L. REV. 565, 591 (2018) (“[I]f an immigration judge errantly finds a citizen is an ‘alien’ and he is
removed from this country, he is not only stripped of his fundamental right to citizenship, but he is
also stripped of all the other rights afforded by the Constitution.”); Kevin R. Johnson, Trump’s Latinx
Repatriation, 66 UCLA L. REV. 1444, 1503 (2019) (“President Trump seeks to radically remake
immigration law and immigration enforcement. In so doing, the administration has taken a series of
steps that would reduce the racial diversity of immigrants to the United States.”).
132. See, e.g., Molly Ball, Donald Trump and the Politics of Fear, ATL. (Sept. 2, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/donald-trump-and-the-politics-of-fear/498116/
[https://perma.cc/R8YY-2KL5]; Philip Klinkner, Op-Ed: Yes, Trump’s Hard-Line Immigration Stance
Helped Him Win the Election—But It Could Be His Undoing, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2017, 4:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-klinker-immigration-election-20170417-story.html
[https://perma.cc/Y3EQ-T7LN (dark archive)] (“Data from the recently released American National
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immigration-related infractions.133 These actions increased the burden on
immigrants in a number of ways, including increasing the wait time for
naturalization and creating instability for “green card holders[,] . . . DACA
recipients, TPS holders, and other immigrants holding lesser legal
protections.”134
One of the tools to enforce Trump’s immigration policy was the
digitization of decades-old fingerprint records to verify the consistency of
immigration records, an operation known as “Operation Janus” that had roots
in the Obama administration.135 After this and other measures led to multiple
denaturalizations during the Trump presidency, the DOJ announced the
creation of a Denaturalization Section within its Civil Division—a further
increase in the DOJ’s commitment to “bring justice to terrorists, war criminals,
sex offenders, and other fraudsters who illegally obtained naturalization.”136 The
DOJ explained in its press release: “While the Office of Immigration Litigation
already has achieved great success in the denaturalization cases it has brought,
winning ninety-five percent of the time, the growing number of referrals
anticipated from law enforcement agencies motivated the creation of a
standalone section dedicated to this important work.”137
Notably, the DOJ was rather selective in the types of cases it chose to
mention—and not to mention—in that press release. For example, the DOJ did
not discuss its very first denaturalization: a case in which the litigant was never
personally served, the proceedings were litigated in the defendant’s absence,
Election Study has finally provided an answer: Immigration was central to the election, and hostility
toward immigrants animated Trump voters.”).
133. Donald J. Trump, Transcript of Donald Trump’s Immigration Speech, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/us/politics/transcript-trump-immigration-speech.html
[https://perma.cc/PW3G-MVJW (dark archive)] (stating that under his presidency, “all immigration
laws will be enforced . . . [and] no one will be immune or exempt from enforcement . . . . Anyone who
has entered the United States illegally is subject to deportation. That is what it means to have laws and
to have a country.”).
134. Ming H. Chen, Making Litigating Citizenship More Fair, 73 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 133, 138
(2020); see also COLO. STATE ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., CITIZENSHIP
DELAYED: CIVIL RIGHTS AND VOTING RIGHTS IMPLICATIONS OF THE BACKLOG IN CITIZENSHIP
AND NATURALIZATION APPLICATIONS 9 (2019) (discussing how the processing time for citizenship
applications has increased from 5.6 months in 2016 to 10.1 months in 2019); Ming H. Chen, Citizenship
Denied: Implications of the Naturalization Backlog for Noncitizens in the Military, 98 DENV. U. L. REV. 669,
676 (2020) (“[T]he estimated range for processing time at the end of 2019 was five and a half to twelve
months.”).
135. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-16-130, POTENTIALLY
INELIGIBLE INDIVIDUALS HAVE BEEN GRANTED U.S. CITIZENSHIP BECAUSE OF INCOMPLETE
FINGERPRINT RECORDS 2 (2016), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/Mgmt/2016/
OIG-16-130-Sep16.pdf [https://perma.cc/TUE4-3Dt7].
136. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affs., Dep’t of Just., The Department of Justice Creates Section
Dedicated to Denaturalization Cases (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departmentjustice-creates-section-dedicated-denaturalization-cases [https://perma.cc/ZG9A-FV8Y].
137. Id.
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and no attorney was there to represent the interests of the defendant, a man
named Baljinder Singh.138 Singh’s “fraud” was based on suspicions that he
(allegedly intentionally) filed a second asylum application with a different first
name, even though he had no incentive to act improperly when the first
application had never been adjudicated.139 Although the DOJ suggested that it
was targeting the worst of the worst for denaturalization, the reality is that
Singh lived in the United States for over thirty years with no criminal record
whatsoever; as Masha Gessen wrote about his case: “The case against Singh
contains no allegations of other violations. It appears that Singh has lived in the
United States his entire adult life, without incident. The Justice Department
has stated that he is forty-three, which would mean that he came to this country
as a teen-ager.”140 As we have pointed out in earlier work, there is no indication
that Singh ever learned about the case against him, either before the
denaturalization judgment or after it.141
Another case not trumpeted by the government involved a sexagenarian
grandmother named Norma Borgoño, an office manager who allegedly failed to
meet the good moral character required at the time she acquired citizenship.142
She had pleaded guilty to preparing paperwork that her boss used in fraudulent
transactions, an offense that she was also accused of failing to disclose.143 Her
financial gain from her boss’s illegal dealings was less than $2,000,144 she worked
a second job during her probation, she paid the ordered restitution in full,145 and
she otherwise led an unremarkable life in the United States for decades—a
country she might be forced to leave despite suffering from a rare kidney disease
for which she may not be able to receive treatment in her native Peru.146
Because imposing genuine “zero tolerance” is simply impossible, the actual
result of the Trump government’s policies has predictably consisted of an
arbitrary assortment of denaturalizations and other denials of citizenship

138. See (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 414–18 (explaining the technological
improvements that led to the reopening of naturalization files).
139. Id.
140. Gessen, supra note 119.
141. See (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 416–17.
142. Affidavit of David Jansen at 2, ¶ 15, United States v. Borgoño, No. 1:18-cv-21835 (S.D. Fla.
May 8 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1060901/download [https://perma.cc/
UQR8-VKCM].
143. Id. at 3, ¶ 8.
144. See id. at 3, ¶ 10 (stating the amount was $1996.75).
145. See Adiel Kaplan, Miami Grandma Targeted as U.S. Takes Aim at Naturalized Immigrants with
Prior Offenses, MIA. HERALD (July 12, 2018, 5:45 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/
immigration/article214173489.html [https://perma.cc/32JG-RBGZ].
146. See Patricia Mazzei, Congratulations, You Are Now a U.S. Citizen. Unless Someone Decides Later
You’re Not, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/us/denaturalize-citizenimmigration.html [https://perma.cc/J8R4-6ZU6 (dark archive)].
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status.147 Even leaving aside the disconcerting cases where it turned out that the
government’s pursuit of citizenship loss was based on sheer error, the offenses
leading to denaturalization largely appear unimpressive when viewed through
the lens of what actual danger those immigrants represented to the U.S.
population at large. Indeed, most of these individuals committed either minor
or no other offenses during their (sometimes lengthy) lives in the United
States.148
While the individuals who have drawn the legal attention of the Trump
administration are quite diverse, a few trends stand out. First, almost all
individuals pursued seem to be ethnic minorities. Second, most of the people
involved appear to be of modest means. While some of that may be explained
by immigration demographics, it raises concerns about targeting and the
difficulty in mounting vigorous defenses due to racial biases and the costs of the
legal process. As other scholars have pointed out, “many of the immigrant
groups most affected by denaturalization under the Trump administration are
those originating from countries that have been targets of President Trump’s
public attacks (e.g., Mexico, Haiti, and Nigeria).”149
Not all citizenship challenges in the Trump era have sought
denaturalization, however. In some cases, the government targeted individuals
who were born in the United States and whose citizenship the government had
previously recognized for decades.150 Mark Esqueda served in the U.S. military
for eight years and lost part of his hearing while fighting in combat zones, but
the State Department denied him a passport for years because it claimed that
the midwife who signed his Texas birth certificate lied about which side of the
border he was born on.151 It took over six years and an intervention by the
American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, where Esqueda now lives, to
resolve the situation in his favor.152 In one of the less common cases (seemingly
involving a nonminority individual) Gwyneth Barbara, a Kansas resident, was
suddenly told her birth certificate was insufficient to procure a passport because
she was born at a farmhouse rather than a hospital—even though her father had
recorded her birth at a courthouse within days.153 Shortly after a U.S. senator

147. For a discussion on how the arbitrariness and unpredictability of the use of denaturalization
procedures may in themselves present due-process difficulties, see (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra
note 6, at 409–14.
148. See Ryo & Peacock, supra note 104, at 13 (discussing denying naturalization to applicants with
minor criminal histories).
149. Id. at 19 n.5 (citation omitted).
150. See Stahl, supra note 1.
151. Id.
152. See id.; Press Release, ACLU of Minn., ACLU-MN Wins Fight To Get U.S.-Born Veteran
Declared Citizen (July 30, 2019), https://www.aclu-mn.org/en/press-releases/aclu-mn-wins-fight-getus-born-veteran-declared-citizen [https://perma.cc/MRE8-3PG7].
153. See Birth Certificate Wasn’t Enough To Prove Citizenship, supra note 2.
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intervened on Barbara’s behalf, she obtained her passport in the mail without
further explanation.154
The Trump administration also launched a multipronged attack on those
it deemed to have questionable citizenship, whether it believed that said
citizenship was obtained fraudulently (by the individual themselves or
sometimes through the doings of a parent) or accidentally. Some of the people
whose citizenship is under attack are more sympathetic than others. Indeed, the
case of a wounded veteran, such as Esqueda, is likely to evoke greater public
support than that of Hoda Muthana, whose passport was revoked on the basis
of her father’s diplomat status at the time of her birth on U.S. soil only after
she left for Syria where she became an ISIS “bride.”155
These cases illustrate how easily the government can declare that someone
was never a citizen at all. When the government deems a birth certificate to be
suspicious, longstanding citizens may have a hard time proving they were born
on American soil—and the more time has passed, the harder it can be to prove.
All witnesses to the birth could be dead, and medical professionals’ memories
may have faded after dozens of years have passed. According to data, “[a]lmost
all [the people being denied passports are] Hispanic, living in a heavily
Democratic sliver of Texas.”156 The result for those individuals is costly and
littered with downright absurd hoops: “[P]assport applicants who are able to
afford the legal costs are suing the federal government over their passport
denials. Typically, the applicants eventually win those cases, after government
attorneys raise a series of sometimes bizarre questions about their birth [such
as]: ‘Do you remember when you were born?’”157 Taken together, these policies
appear to form “a broader immigration policy known as ‘attrition through
enforcement,’” that targets both legal and illegal immigration.158
B.

What the Justice Department Says—and What It Does

Authors Timothy Belsan and Aaron Petty argue that scholars are alarmist
in their critique of current citizenship challenges.159 Although they wrote in
154. See id.
155. See Litigating Citizenship, supra note 22, at 769–71.
156. Kevin Sieff, U.S. Is Denying Passports to Americans Along the Border, Throwing Their Citizenship
into Question, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2018, 6:18 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
the_americas/us-is-denying-passports-to-americans-along-the-border-throwing-their-citizenshipinto-question/2018/08/29/1d630e84-a0da-11e8-a3dd-2a1991f075d5_story.html [https://perma.cc/7X76
-2FDQ].
157. Id.
158. Amanda Frost, Alienating Citizens, 114 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 48, 73 (2019) (“Aggressive
use of denaturalization accomplishes that goal by sending the message that no immigrant has a safe and
secure status, and therefore none can enjoy the ‘assumption of permanence’ that naturalized citizens
had come to expect.”).
159. Timothy M. Belsan & Aaron R. Petty, Civil Revocation of Naturalization: Myths and
Misunderstandings, 56 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 3 (2019) (“Unfortunately, much of the discussion surrounding
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their personal capacities, both worked for the DOJ.160 Belsan and Petty argue
that prosecutorial discretion will protect citizens: “[T]he Department of Justice,
which litigates the cases, has to agree that the facts and law in a given case
warrant filing a denaturalization lawsuit, and the U.S. Attorney must institute
each proceeding individually.”161 They suggest that this discretion will be
applied so the denaturalization will focus on “(1) convicted terrorists and
individuals who pose national security concerns; (2) human rights violators and
war criminals; (3) serious felons (including a large number who committed
sexual offenses against minors); and (4) fraud cases.”162 They further limit the
DOJ’s interest in fraud to that which is “willful and deliberate” and a threat to
the “body politic.”163 Further, they write, scholars’ concerns are “unfounded in
civil cases: an applicant cannot be denaturalized for misrepresentations unless
the misrepresentation was either intentional, material, or both.”164 But is that
true? Does DOJ discretion ensure that only cases posing a threat to the country
will be pursued?
Thus far, the evidence points strongly toward no. Belsan and Petty
identify the correct substantive legal standard, but that standard is only as
strong as the procedural protections that surround its enforcement. Petty
litigated the Baljinder Singh case, where the procedural history left no
confidence that the substantive standard was met.165 Certainly, the government
alleged that Singh had intentionally misrepresented his identity in an earlier
proceeding.166 But the evidence that the government produced to prove that
misrepresentation was exceedingly weak and more consistent with bureaucratic
error on the government’s part than intentional wrongdoing on Singh’s.167
When the government filed the denaturalization suit, however, a series of

denaturalization, and especially the law governing the civil denaturalization process, has been
inaccurate, poorly researched, and/or shown a lack of appreciation for critical nuance. At the extreme,
some have even argued that the United States should eliminate denaturalization entirely, without
regard to the nature of the case or the degree of fraud.”).
160. As of this writing, Belsan is the Director of the Enforcement Section in the U.S. Department
of Justice’s Office of Immigration Litigation. Biographical Information, BD. OF IMMIGR. APPEALS,
DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals-bios [https://perma.cc/
T89U-782X]. Petty also worked for the DOJ in the Office of Immigration Litigation and in fact
prosecuted the Baljinder Singh case described above. Id. In April 2020, he was appointed to an
administrative judgeship with the Board of Immigration Appeals. Id.
161. Belsan & Petty, supra note 159, at 31.
162. Id. at 7.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 27.
165. We discuss the procedural foibles of the Singh case at length in (Un)Civil Denaturalization,
supra note 6, at 414–18.
166. Id. at 417.
167. Id. at 417–18 (providing potential explanations for the error, such as describing that the
translator may have made a mistake in recording the name).
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procedural defaults meant that the merits were never challenged in court.168
Singh was not personally served and there was no proof in the record that he
even knew about the denaturalization proceeding. He did not show up to defend
it—perhaps because he did not know about it, perhaps because he could not
afford to hire an attorney to defend his citizenship even if he did know.169
Although it is possible that Singh committed intentional fraud, it seems
unlikely given that he would have had no incentive to do so.170 Ultimately, the
court credited the government’s allegations as true and denaturalized Singh in
a summary judgment.171
But isn’t denaturalization necessary to root out terrorists? Belsan and
Petty’s first category of denaturalization targets, after all, was “convicted
terrorists.”172 Press releases from the DOJ also tout a national security rationale
for increasing the resources dedicated to denaturalization.173 A closer look at one
of the first fully litigated cases involving an individual with alleged terrorist ties
suggests that the national security rationale may be more tenuous than it first
appears.
Abderrahmane Farhane was a Brooklyn bookstore owner who, until the
events giving rise to his denaturalization, had no criminal history.174 But in the
months after 9/11, the government ramped up its law enforcement activities in
Muslim communities to identify individuals who might be plotting terrorist
attacks or assisting those interested in doing so.175 In late 2001, Farhane “was
approached by a government informant [as part of a sting operation] . . . who
sought his assistance to transfer money overseas to Mujahadeen.”176 The
government’s sentencing memo describes this conversation, stating that first
“CS-1 [the informant] asked Farhane how CS-1 would be able to send money
to fighters in Chechyna and Afghanistan. Farhane responded that he would ask

168. Id. at 454.
169. Id. at 416.
170. Frost, supra note 158, at 71 (“In short, it seems unlikely that Singh willfully evaded a hearing
in immigration court in January 1992—a hearing at which he could have asserted asylum—only to turn
around and apply for asylum a month later. Indeed, it is hard to see what he could possibly have gained
by giving a false first name, purposely not showing up at a hearing so that he would be ordered deported
in absentia, and then immediately seeking asylum under a slightly different first name.”).
171. United States v. Singh, No. CV 17-7214 (SRC), 2018 WL 305325, at *6 (D.N.J. Jan. 5, 2018).
172. Belsan & Petty, supra note 159, at 7.
173. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affs., supra note 136.
174. Memorandum of Law in Aid of Sentencing for Defendant Abderrahman Farhane at 5, United
States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 05 CR. 673 (LAP)) [hereinafter Memorandum of
Law in Aid of Sentencing].
175. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009) (explaining that in the months after 9/11 “the
FBI questioned more than 1,000 people with suspected links to the attacks in particular or to terrorism
in general”).
176. Memorandum of Law in Aid of Sentencing, supra note 174, at 5.
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some ‘brothers’ to provide information about how to send money and would get
back to CS-1.”177 At a later point,
Farhane told CS-1 that there were “people we trust” with whom CS-1
could send money overseas. Farhane instructed CS-1 to send less than
the whole amount and explained that if CS-1 sent less than $10,000, such
a transfer would avoid law enforcement scrutiny since it was “what the
law allows.” Farhane and CS-1 also discussed how individuals were
attempting to collect money at the local mosques for the “fighters” in
Afghanistan but that people were afraid of donating funds since it could
“lead them to problems.”178
Farhane did not transfer any money or take any other action.179
The next year, in 2002, Farhane became a naturalized citizen.180 The
government continued to monitor Farhane and others.181 Four years after the
initial conversation with the informant, the government became suspicious of
another individual who had communicated with Farhane.182 In 2005, the FBI
questioned Farhane about conversations that he had had with the confidential
informant and with the other individual.183 During the course of this
questioning, Farhane allegedly lied to the FBI, claiming that although he was
familiar with both people, he had never met with them in person.184 Farhane
was subsequently arrested.185 The indictment alleged that he had made false
statements to a federal officer and that he had “conspired to assist another in
transferring money from the United States to a place outside the United
States,” in violation of money-laundering statutes, and that he had lied to the
FBI when they investigated the transaction.186
The charge for lying to a federal officer seems to have been fairly clear—
Farhane had stated that he had not met with the two individuals, but the
government had compelling evidence, and even transcripts, showing that he
177. Sentencing Memorandum at 3, United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011) (No.
S3 05 Cr. 673 (LAP)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 13 (“Farhane’s conduct in attempting to assist in the transferring of funds earmarked to
provide jihadists fighting in Afghanistan and Chechnya with weapons and equipment, and then lying
about that conduct, falls comfortably within the heartland of the terrorism-related activities that
Congress has sought to punish severely and deter.”).
180. United States v. Farhane, No. 05 CR. 673-4 (LAP), 2020 WL 1527768, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
31, 2020).
181. Memorandum of Law in Aid of Sentencing, supra note 174, at 12.
182. Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 177, at 3–5 (describing the investigation of Tarik Shah).
183. Id. at 4–5.
184. Id. at 4.
185. Id.
186. Defendant-Appellant Abdulrahman Farhane’s Brief Filed Pursuant to Anders v. California at
2, United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 07-5531-cr (CON)) [hereinafter
Defendant-Appellant’s Brief].
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had.187 The “conspiring to assist another in transferring money” in violation of
money laundering statutes was likely a more difficult charge for the government
to prove. The government was investigating individuals who provided material
support to terrorists, and others in his community were charged with that
crime.188 But Farhane’s advice to the informant to send less than $10,000 to
avoid government scrutiny appeared to run afoul of money-laundering
statutes—it is true that transactions over $10,000 will receive extra
governmental scrutiny, but Congress has also made it a crime to structure
transactions to be less than $10,000 to avoid such attention.189 Farhane, of
course, did not transfer any funds at all. But by advising the informant to
structure the funds transfer in this manner, he was alleged to have “conspired
to assist another” with an illegal transaction.190
Farhane thus faced a choice: accept a plea bargain or risk trial. The
government alleged that the “conspiracy to assist another” with structuring was
a terrorism-related offense that when combined with the charge for lying could
carry a sentence of 360 months to life in prison, even with no other criminal
history.191 And though conspiracy to assist with structuring might be difficult to
prove, the charge for lying to the FBI would likely be a slam-dunk. Under the
circumstances, Farhane accepted the plea deal and served ten years in prison;
he was released in 2017.192
In 2018, however, Farhane’s denaturalization saga began. The government
brought a denaturalization petition, arguing that Farhane’s naturalization had
been procured by fraud.193 Post-naturalization criminal conduct, such as his
lying to the FBI in 2005, could not be used to put his citizenship in jeopardy.194
But the 2001 conduct—when Farhane had suggested that the informant
structure the monetary gift in an amount less than $10,000—was allegedly

187. Memorandum of Law in Aid of Sentencing, supra note 174, at 8.
188. The government indicated that if Farhane had not agreed to plead guilty to the moneylaundering claim, he may have been tried for conspiracy to provide material support for terrorism. See
Memorandum of Law in Support of Pretrial Motions Filed on Behalf of Aber Rahman Farhane at 3,
Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 05 CR. 673 (LAP)).
189. See Peter J. Reilly, Structuring Seems Like a Crime You Can Commit by Accident, FORBES (June
4, 2015, 3:55 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2015/06/04/structuring-seems-like-acrime-you-can-commit-by-accident/#580038854030 [https://perma.cc/9N9F-TNUV] (“Of course, it is
easier to convict them of structuring than whatever their structuring was intended to obscure. . . .
Given that it is something that can be done otherwise innocently, though, it may put too much power
in the hands of prosecutors.”).
190. Defendant-Appellant’s Brief, supra note 186, at 2.
191. Id. at 2–3.
192. United States v. Farhane, No. 05 CR. 673-4 (LAP), 2020 WL 1527768, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
31, 2020).
193. Id.
194. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 292–93 (1967) (prohibiting involuntary denaturalization once
citizenship has been lawfully obtained).
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disqualifying criminal conduct.195 Of course, the government knew of this
conduct in 2001, before Farhane had applied for and received naturalization, yet
had chosen neither to prosecute him then nor to deny his naturalization
application. But in 2018, nearly two decades after the conduct at issue and after
Farhane had served ten years, the government alleged that Farhane had lied
when he answered “no” to the question of “whether he had ever knowingly
committed a crime for which he had not been arrested” when it was asked as
part of his naturalization.196
Like Borgoño, Farhane might have been able to argue that his actions did
not amount to a crime; there was no proof that the contemplated funds would
have gone to an illegal activity, and the mens rea for a structuring crime is
difficult to prove—much less the mens rea to assist a conspiracy to commit
structuring.197 But the admissions contained in the plea deal precluded Farhane
from litigating those issues. Farhane brought a later habeas proceeding
attempting to vacate the original conviction—after he had served his time—to
avoid denaturalization.198 The Supreme Court has held, after all, that a habeas
claim can undo a plea agreement when the lawyer fails to warn the defendant
of potential immigration consequences.199 But in something of a Catch-22, the
court denied relief to Farhane—denaturalization was so unusual in 2005 that
“Mr. Farhane’s lawyer had no basis for suspecting that the guilty plea could
have immigration consequences,” and it therefore “was not objectively
unreasonable for his lawyer to give no advice on that issue.”200
The court’s logic here leaves something to be desired—if denaturalization
was such an unexpected result that a reasonable lawyer could not have been
expected to advise Farhane about it before his plea, then it is equally unlikely
that Farhane could have considered the citizenship consequences of pleading
guilty. It is also notable how long the government waited to pursue Farhane.
The relevant conduct occurred in 2001, and the government knew about it at
that time—but saw no need to charge him with a crime until 2005, when it could
make an easier case for his lying to the FBI. Then it waited until 2018 to pursue
civil denaturalization for the 2001 conduct. If the government had wanted to, it
could have brought a criminal naturalization fraud charge against Farhane when
it brought the other charges. The fact that it chose not to suggests that public
protection was not the immediate goal.
195. Farhane, 2020 WL 1527768, at *2.
196. Id. at *1.
197. See United States v. MacPherson, 424 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that for the
government to convict a defendant of a structuring offense, the defendant must have acted “with
knowledge that the financial institutions involved were legally obligated to report currency transactions
in excess of $10,000” and “inten[ded] to evade this reporting requirement”).
198. Farhane, 2020 WL 1527768, at *1.
199. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373–74 (2010).
200. Farhane, 2020 WL 1527768, at *2.
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The early cases involving Borgoño, Singh, and Farhane therefore do not
seem to fit within the stated priorities of the DOJ. Why aren’t DOJ prosecutors
using their discretion to let these cases go? In fact, by creating a performance
metric where the government is judged on its ability to prevail in at least eighty
percent of the cases it brings, the DOJ has created incentives to pursue the cases
that are easiest to win rather than those that might pose the greatest threat.201
Thus, in one denaturalization case litigated in 2019, the ground for
denaturalization was merely that the defendant had been absent from the
United States for two out of the five years preceding his 2005 naturalization.202
Under the statute, he should not have been absent for more than six months.203
The court therefore did not even consider whether the defendant had willfully
misstated his qualifications or whether the mistake was material. The mere fact
of his presence outside the United States more than fifteen years in the past
was enough to take away the defendant’s citizenship.204
U.S. attorneys have recognized the incentives favoring civil
denaturalization. In a 2017 article in the U.S. Attorneys Bulletin, several
government officials “encourage[d] Federal prosecutors to consider referring
cases for civil denaturalization when a case is declined for prosecution.”205 They
write that filing civil proceedings rather than criminal actions offers several
“benefits”: civil litigation carries a lower burden of proof, there is no statute of
limitations on civil denaturalization, there is no right to a jury trial, and there
is no right to appointed counsel.206 The cases that are the easiest to win are the
ones where the citizen is unable to defend themselves—either because they did
not even know about the proceeding or because they could not afford to hire an
attorney to litigate the case.
C.

Judicial Discomfort with Denaturalization Proceedings

The lack of procedural protections in denaturalization cases, combined
with the cases’ sometimes tenuous connection to national security or public
safety, has led courts to express significant concern about some of the litigation
201. There is a parallel in immigration enforcement proceedings, where agents pursue
undocumented “targets” that are suspected of committing crimes, but then make “collateral” arrests of
undocumented individuals unconnected with the crimes (when the targets cannot be located) to meet
apprehension goals. See IMMIGRATION NATION: INSTALLING FEAR (Netflix 2020).
202. United States v. Shalabi, No. 19-13709, 2020 WL 4282200, at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 27, 2020)
(“Thus, at minimum, Shalabi was absent from the United States for a continuous period of roughly
two years and three months during the five years immediately preceding his application for
citizenship.”).
203. Id.
204. Id. (“Shalabi admits that he left the United States no later than January 1, 2011 and that he
did not return until at least April 6, 2003.”).
205. Anthony D. Blanco, Paul Bullis & Troy Liggett, Civil Denaturalization: Safeguarding the
Integrity of U.S. Citizenship, U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL. 5, 6 (2017).
206. Id. at 8.
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coming before them. In one case, the government sought to revoke the
citizenship of a woman who had allegedly entered the United States on a false
passport during her youth.207 Although the court ultimately ruled in favor of the
government, it expressed some reluctance and suggested that the law should
impose limits:
The Court makes the following acknowledgment. Charles is a sixty-yearold woman who has lived half her life in the United States. She works as
an accountant and, since she was naturalized fifteen years ago, has been
a law-abiding American citizen. There is no contention to the contrary.
Charles committed a low-level fraud. In a case such as this, to truly
administer justice, the legal tools of statute of limitations and judicial
discretion are most needed, yet absent.208
The court noted an issue about which we have also written elsewhere209—the
counterintuitive circumstance that criminal denaturalization offers more
protection than civil denaturalization:
Curiously, civil denaturalization has a more responsible sibling in
criminal denaturalization. Criminal denaturalization provides much
more protection to the naturalized citizen. First, there is a statute of
limitations of ten years. Second, the government must prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt. Third, all criminal law safeguards apply,
including the right to a jury trial and the Fifth Amendment protection
against self-incrimination. Under this legal regime, it may be more
advantageous for the government to be less diligent, to wait until the
passage of ten years, in order to commence civil denaturalization instead
of the stricter criminal process. For the law to condone this opportunity
for governmental abuse of power is a promotion of injustice. Civil and
criminal denaturalization are substantively comparable, as both may arise
from the same conduct . . . both require similar legal analysis; and the
relief the government seeks is often the same—revocation of citizenship.
Therefore, the same handy legal tools, especially a statute of limitations,
are warranted in both actions. The Court is concerned that the law
presently allows this disparity.210
In Norma Borgoño’s case, the judge wrote that he was “sympathetic” to
her claim that the government had waited too long to contest her citizenship,
but nonetheless ruled that laches could not bar a claim for denaturalization.211

207. United States. v. Charles, 456 F. Supp. 3d 268, 274–75 (D. Mass. 2020).
208. Id. at 287.
209. See (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 454–60.
210. Charles, 456 F. Supp. 3d at 287–88 (citations omitted).
211. United States v. Borgoño, No. 18-21835-CIV, 2019 WL 1755709, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 19,
2019) (denying a motion to dismiss, the court noted that “[a]lthough the Court is sympathetic to
Borgoño’s argument, her position is nonetheless unavailing. . . . ‘[T]he United States is not subject to
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Another judge wrote that the government’s “boundless discretion means that
these second-class citizens can never feel entirely secure in their claim to
American citizenship,” especially as defendants in denaturalization cases “often
do not have the right to a court-appointed attorney nor the money to hire
one.”212 Another expressed concern about the “weighty consequence of
denaturalization,” and therefore appointed pro bono counsel to the
denaturalization defendant.213 Finally, even Justices on the Supreme Court have
expressed doubt that denaturalization can be based on minor
misrepresentations. In Maslenjak v. United States214 the Court ruled that, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, misrepresentations must be material to the
naturalization process.215 At oral argument, Justice Breyer suggested that a
“serious constitutional question” is raised when an American citizen can “have
his citizenship taken away because 40 years before, he did not deliberately put
on paper what his nickname was or what . . . his speeding record was 30 years
before that, which was, in fact, totally immaterial.”216 The Justices questioned
the attorneys about the same question that was at issue in Farhane’s
denaturalization: “Have you EVER committed . . . a crime or offense for which
you were NOT arrested?”217 This question clearly troubled the Justices, as it
would seem to allow the denaturalization of anyone who failed to report each
and every instance in which they exceeded the speed limit without being pulled
over. Thus, the Supreme Court seemed to repeat the pattern from the last
century: responding with skepticism to the political branches’ attempts to limit
citizenship rights.
III. THE RIGHT TO REMAIN AMERICAN
The Supreme Court in Afroyim held that citizenship cannot be
involuntarily taken away, but left open a loophole: citizenship obtained by fraud
or error can be revoked. For nearly half a century, very few cases were litigated
under that loophole. Now, however, the situation is more complex: the
government is intentionally pursuing large numbers of denaturalization cases.

the defense of laches in enforcing its rights.’”) (quoting United States v. Mandycz, 447 F.3d 951, 964
(6th Cir. 2006))).
212. United States v. Eguilos, 383 F. Supp. 3d 1014, 1022 (E.D. Cal. 2019).
213. United States v. Multani, No. 2:19-CV-01789-BJR, 2020 WL 4581184, at *1 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 3, 2020). Although no statute requires appointed representation for indigent denaturalization
defendants, we have argued elsewhere that constitutional due process likely gives rise to a right to
counsel. See (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 459–60.
214. 137 S. Ct. 1918 (2017).
215. Id. at 1929.
216. Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. 1918 (No. 16-309).
217. Maslenjak, 137 S. Ct. at 1927.
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We argue elsewhere that pursuing denaturalization as a policy likely
violates the substantive due-process protections of the U.S. Constitution.218 We
expand that argument here: we propose that once the government recognizes
an individual’s U.S. citizenship, and once that individual relies on the
citizenship grant to structure his or her life and business, the government cannot
take that citizenship away.
A.

Substantive Due Process

Courts look to the doctrine of substantive due process to determine
“whether there is a sufficient substantive justification, a good enough reason for
[] a deprivation [of citizenship].”219 Substantive due process also interacts with
other constitutional protections, including procedural due process and the
Citizenship Clause.220 For instance, the Supreme Court has explicitly warned
against applying different standards to naturalized citizens and those born in
the United States,221 suggesting that it would risk creating “a second-class”
citizenship.222 Moreover, even though the Afroyim Court left open a loophole
for cases of fraud and illegal procurement,223 the main thrust of the opinion was
to warn of precisely the situations we see today. The Court warned that
denaturalization could be wielded as a political weapon—that a group of citizens
“temporarily in office can deprive another group of citizens of their
citizenship.”224
Although courts criticizing the lack of due process in denaturalization cases
have largely felt constrained to rule in favor of the government, the Supreme
Court’s post-1967 development of substantive due process and equal liberty in
cases outside of the denaturalization context suggests that a closer examination
of substantive due process is warranted in cases involving citizenship claims.
Substantive due process is grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
which forbid depriving a person of “life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”225 It asks whether particular restrictions on liberty are
constitutionally valid—that is, whether there is “a sufficient substantive

218. See (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 460–64.
219. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999).
220. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015) (“The Due Process Clause and the
Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent
principles.”).
221. See United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374, 1383 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Schneider and Afroyim do
stand for the propositions that naturalized and native citizens must be treated equally and that before
any citizen can be expatriated or denaturalized there must be a voluntary and intentional act.”).
222. See id.
223. See Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267 n.23 (1967).
224. Id. at 268.
225. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
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justification” for that deprivation of liberty, and it protects against the arbitrary
loss of fundamental rights.226
The Supreme Court relied on the doctrine of substantive due process to
strike down same-sex marriage restrictions in Obergefell v. Hodges.227 The Court
outlined two requirements for substantive due-process protection: first, the
liberty at issue must be a fundamental right,228 and second, the Court must
consider “central reference to specific historical practices” in determining
whether a right is fundamental.229 There is little doubt that citizenship is a
fundamental right: it is the very foundation of membership in the polity, giving
rise to an equal vote in political matters.230 There is also no doubt that
citizenship rights have been recognized through historical practice. Chief
Justice John Marshall himself, the fourth Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court, understood that people relied on their citizenship when he warned that
attempting to revoke a previously recognized claim of citizenship would cause
“great mischief.”231
The government can deprive individuals of a fundamental right only if
there is a compelling state interest.232 In most of the citizenship cases litigated
over the past few years, it is difficult at best to find a compelling state interest.
Even in the cases allegedly tied to terrorism, the government waited over a
decade to seek denaturalization.233 The government has identified some interest
in denaturalization, including protecting Congress’s power to set naturalization

226. Chemerinsky, supra note 219, at 1501; see also Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell,
Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1807 (2012).
227. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015) (“The right of same-sex couples
to marry that is part of the liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that
Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws.”).
228. See id. at 2602.
229. Id.
230. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“Though not regarded strictly as a natural
right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society, according to its will, under certain conditions,
nevertheless it is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.”); see also
Catherine Yonsoo Kim, Note, Revoking Your Citizenship: Minimizing the Likelihood of Administrative
Error, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1448, 1466 (2001) (“Citizenship, once attained, constitutes a fundamental
right.”).
231. See supra text accompanying notes 48–51.
232. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (“The theory is that some liberties are ‘so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,’ and therefore cannot be
deprived without compelling justification.” (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934))).
233. See supra Section II.B.
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requirements,234 deterring immigration fraud,235 and defending the nation
against those who mean it harm.236
But abridging fundamental interests is subject to strict scrutiny, and these
interests are neither sufficiently strong nor sufficiently tailored to support
upholding citizenship revocation.237 After all, protecting Congress’s
naturalization power could be better accomplished on the front end through
careful naturalization processes, rather than on the back end through revocation.
And given the criminal penalties already at play for immigration fraud
(including incarceration and a permanent ban from the United States), it is
unlikely that denaturalization adds any significant disincentive.238
B.

Democratic Citizenship

It is necessary to recognize citizenship as a fundamental right to protect
constitutional guarantees of political participation. As far as protecting the
political fabric of the nation goes, we note elsewhere that “[t]he lesson of
McCarthyism during the Red Scare was that the political fabric of the nation is
strongest when political ideas are freely expressed; trying to suppress political
disagreement is itself a threat to the American identity and political fabric.”239
Professor Patti Lenard outlines three key reasons why revocation cannot
be squared with the concept of democratic citizenship:

234. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 518 (1981) (“An alien who seeks political rights
as a member of this Nation can rightfully obtain them only upon the terms and conditions specified by
Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or modifications; their duty is rigidly to
enforce the legislative will in respect of a matter so vital to the public welfare.” (quoting United States
v. Ginsberg, 243 U.S. 472, 474–75 (1917))).
235. See Rainer Bauböck & Vesco Paskalev, Cutting Genuine Links: A Normative Analysis of
Citizenship Deprivation, 30 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 80 (2015).
236. Peter J. Spiro, Expatriating Terrorists, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2169, 2171 (2014) (“As those
hostile to the United States retain their citizenship, citizenship will no longer demarcate the boundary
between friends and enemies.”).
237. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in
the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 864 (2006) (“Substantive due-process cases, which make up
the majority of strict scrutiny applications in the fundamental rights area, survive at a rate (22%)
consistent with strict scrutiny more generally.”).
238. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i); see also Robert L. Reeves, Visa Fraud and Waivers, REEVES
IMMIGR. L. GRP. https://www.rreeves.com/immigration-news/visa-fraud-waivers/ [https://perma.cc/
9BX9-C32A] (“A finding of fraud under section 212(a)(6)(c) of the INA results in a lifetime bar for
future immigration benefits such as a green card and the ability to petition family unless granted a
waiver.”).
239. (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 464; see also Masumi Izumi, Alienable Citizenship:
Race, Loyalty and the Law in the Age of ‘American Concentration Camps,’ 1941–1971, 13 ASIAN AM. L.J. 1,
20 (2006) (“[I]n the wake of the McCarthyist fervor, even staunch liberals . . . equated disloyal citizens
with enemy aliens. It shows that in the postwar United States, the border between citizens and aliens
ceased to exist in terms of civil liberties. Freedom became a privilege that only those whom the
government considered loyal enjoyed.”).
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First, revocation laws often treat citizens unequally, by subjecting only
some to the threat of revocation on the basis of national origin or
identity. Second, revocation laws treat citizens unequally by issuing
different punishments for the same crime, again on the basis of national
origin or identity. And third, the reasons offered to support the power
to revoke are inadequate to justify the policy’s profoundly coercive
impact on some citizens.240
In short, a country whose government can revoke citizenship is one that—
in the case of the United States, perpetually—engages in discrimination
between citizens without the level of justification required to relegate a large
part of the population to second-class citizenship. It especially drives a wedge
between individuals born in the United States and those that were not, given
that the latter are at much higher risk of losing citizenship judging from the
government’s track record so far. It also puts at special risk those born in the
United States but near the border, mainly if they are of Hispanic ethnicity.
The chilling effects may be significant, as some groups may choose to stay
out of the public eye their whole lives even if they committed no illegal actions.
This could entail shying away from voicing political opinions that are
controversial and/or disfavored by the particular regime in power, rejecting the
idea of running for office, and generally leading lives of risk-aversion. The loss
from that could be profound not only for these individuals themselves, but also
for the rest of the world that will fail to benefit from their perspectives and
leadership.
Giving the government the ability to revoke citizenship also brings to a
head the relationship between individuals and the state, subverting the values
underlying the political system of the United States. As we discuss in previous
work, governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed; rather
than the state creating the right of citizenship, it is citizens who have
sovereignty and delegate to the government the power to function as a
sovereign.241 What does it mean for a government to be able to cancel the very
root of its own legitimacy? It cannot answer that these individuals were never
citizens in the first place—they clearly were, until revocation. This subjugation
of a subset of the citizenry could ultimately have consequences for all citizens:
not only could they lose their citizenship status, but even short of that, their
other rights could more easily be eroded as well. It is arguably no coincidence

240. Patti Tamara Lenard, Democracies and the Power To Revoke Citizenship, 30 ETHICS & INT’L
AFFS. 73, 78–79 (2016).
241. See (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 464 (citing Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44,
64–65 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting), overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)).
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that the Trump administration’s attack on citizenship rights was accompanied
by other reductions of civil liberties.242
IV. RELIANCE AND FINALITY IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM
Americans have recognized the importance of citizenship security since
the founding of the country. It was in 1830, after all, that Chief Justice John
Marshall pointed out the “great mischief” that would occur if naturalization
could be taken away after an individual had relied on citizenship in managing
business and personal affairs.243 More recently, Masha Gessen expressed a fear
that a renewed emphasis on denaturalization could prevent new citizens from
feeling secure in their identity.244 The court decisions quoted in Section II.C
expressed concern that finality doctrines do not apply in denaturalization
cases.245 The law on that point, however, is not so clear.
This part focuses on some of the foundational principles of the American
legal system. Chief among them are the complementary values of reliance and
finality, both of which give deference to the importance of creating and
respecting settled expectations.
A.

The Value of Reliance

Reliance is a concept weaved throughout our legal doctrines. While
contract law is often the first body of law that comes to mind in that context,
individuals’ ability to count on their property interests (including in the form
of government benefits) is built around the same principle. The Supreme Court
famously stated in Goldberg v. Kelly246 that “[t]he extent to which procedural due
process must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he
may be ‘condemned to suffer grievous loss,’ and depends upon whether the
recipient’s interest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in
summary adjudication.”247 One would be hard-pressed not to view citizenship
as an interest equal to or stronger than the types of property interests to which
this test has been applied.248 As Professor Amy Ronner explains,
242. For one organization’s list of such reductions, see Trump Administration Civil and Human Rights
Rollbacks, LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS., https://civilrights.org/trump-rollbacks/
[https://perma.cc/P98K-7THH].
243. See supra text accompanying notes 48–51.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 119–20.
245. See supra Section II.C.
246. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
247. Id. at 262–63 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
248. Blanche Bong Cook explicitly mentions the idea of a possible “property interest in
citizenship.” Blanche Bong Cook, Johnny Appleseed: Citizenship Transmission Laws and a White
Heteropatriarchal Property Right in Philandering, Sexual Exploitation, and Rape (the “WHP”) or Johnny and
the WHP, 31 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 57, 132–33 (2019).
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[I]ndividuals residing here for a long time take root in our soil. Such a
resident has likely created arteries to a slew of microcosmic communities
such as employers, neighbors, friends, schools, churches, charities, clubs,
and civic groups. Such ties are organic and reciprocating, so that others
may have come to rely on the individual that the government seeks to
expel. Because the passage of time fosters such human networks and
cements them in place, it should infiltrate the deliberative process that
has the potential to dismantle them.249
The Goldberg case itself involved monetary help received under the
federally assisted Aid to Families with Dependent Children program and New
York’s general Home Relief program.250 The Court explained:
Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of rights that
do not fall within traditional common-law concepts of property. It has
been aptly noted that “[s]ociety today is built around entitlement. The
automobile dealer has his franchise, the doctor and lawyer their
professional licenses, the worker his union membership, contract, and
pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options; all are
devices to aid security and independence. Many of the most important
of these entitlements now flow from government: subsidies to farmers
and businessmen, routes for airlines and channels for television stations;
long term contracts for defense, space, and education; social security
pensions for individuals.”251
There is no question that for most people, a loss of U.S. citizenship would
directly or indirectly entail a loss of income or other financial benefits. Indeed,
at least some of the individuals for whom the reverse is true (generally because
they live abroad and no longer wish to pay American taxes) voluntarily choose
to renounce U.S. citizenship.252 Asked another way: how much money would a
U.S. citizen have to be paid, if there is such an amount at all for many people,
to voluntarily give up their citizenship, assuming that they even have or can
claim a different citizenship? Odds are that for most, the amount would have to
be significant, suggesting that the property interest in this status is a large one.
249. Amy D. Ronner, Denaturalization and Death: What It Means To Preclude the Exercise of Judicial
Discretion, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 101, 129 (2005).
250. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 256–57.
251. Id. at 262 n.8 (citing Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)). Indeed, Ayelet Schachar makes a related link when stating that
“[f]rom the perspective of each member of the polity, reconceptualizing his or her entitlement to
citizenship as a complex type of property fits well within the definition of new property, a phrase
famously coined by Charles Reich . . . .” AYELET SCHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY:
CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 29 (2009).
252. Indeed, there has been a significant increase of such cases in early 2020. See Shubhangi Shah,
2020 Witnessed 1,051% Rise in Americans Giving up US Citizenship, INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 13, 2020,
2:33 PM), https://www.ibtimes.sg/2020-witnessed-1051-rise-americans-giving-us-citizenship-44932
[https://perma.cc/ETK8-AM7D].
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This is generally the case because people with U.S. citizenship have built
their lives in reliance on that status.253 They may have chosen a profession that
can mostly or entirely be exercised only on U.S. soil (hello, lawyers!). These
individuals have chosen romantic partners or married spouses that wish to
spend their lives in the United States, and they have built or become a part of
communities deeply embedded in this country. All these actions were taken and
had significant investments of time and money made in them with the belief
that the existence of their U.S. citizenship would be an enduring fact.
This reliance goes hand in hand with the government’s decision to
denaturalize very few people over a long period of time. Indeed, it is rational to
have increased one’s reliance in this area the further denaturalization laws
inched closer toward quasi-desuetude.254 Until recent years, just about anyone,
with the possible exception of former war criminals, simply had no reason to
believe that loss of citizenship was on the table. And all of these individuals—
whether they were born on U.S. soil with the help of midwives or became
naturalized citizens—built their lives around precisely this sense of stability.
B.

Finality and the Law

While there is a trade-off between the goal of accuracy and that of finality,
“[i]n almost every case . . . the value of accuracy will eventually give way to a
need for finality.”255 Courts have applied that principle so far as to deny DNA
tests to convicted individuals.256 Notably,
the principal value served by double jeopardy is finality. Why has
English law for almost 1000 years forbidden a second trial after
conviction or acquittal for the same offense? The answer is elegant and
explains why double jeopardy principles appear in the writings of ancient
Greek philosophers. A defendant who has been acquitted or convicted
deserves to live the rest of his life without being burdened by the threat
of a new trial or new punishment for the same offense. It is the same

253. This is not to diminish the level of property interests that may attach at birth and hence before
any time in which to develop reliance has passed. Some scholars have drawn a direct analogy in that
respect “between the intergenerational transfer of property and birthright citizenship.” Ayelet Schachar
& Ran Hirschl, Citizenship as Inherited Property, 35 POL. THEORY 253, 258–59 (2007).
254. One of us has previously discussed issues surrounding relatively or completely unenforced
laws. See Irina D. Manta, The High Cost of Low Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 157, 167–74 (2014).
255. Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Right To Appeal, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219, 1275 (2013)
[hereinafter The Right To Appeal].
256. See Lindsey Webb, The Immortal Accusation, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1853, 1888 (2015) (stating
that courts have “denied DNA tests to convicted persons with innocence claims based on the principles
of finality”).
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principle of finality that underlies the prohibition of ex post facto laws,
statutes of limitations, and the civil doctrine of res judicata.257
According to the same norms, do naturalized citizens, who underwent a lengthy
process and long waits to obtain their status and the vast majority of whom have
not committed illegal offenses along the way, deserve to live under permanent
threat of losing their status? Should natural-born citizens who have any quirk
in their lives, like not having been born in a hospital, always live with the
concern that the U.S. government could decide some day they have never been
citizens and do not deserve a passport? The fact that, practically speaking, the
current answer to these questions is yes should offend the sense of justice of
anyone who has studied the American justice system and its government’s
historical commitment to democracy. Three features of the U.S. legal system
deserve particular attention in this context because their full-fledged integration
into immigration law is worth seriously pondering: statutes of limitations,
equitable remedies (both equitable estoppel and laches), and time limits on
appeals.
1. Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations have characterized American criminal law since the
founding period, based on both the interests of 1) fairness toward the individual
given the increased difficulties that the passage of time introduces; and 2)
efficiency, in that they motivate the government to investigate suspected
activity promptly and reduce the need to question the appropriateness of
specific prosecutions.258 In the federal criminal system, the few exceptions that
exist are usually reserved for offenses as serious as terrorism, crimes against
children and/or sexual crimes.259 For federal civil causes of action, the “catchall”
provision 28 U.S.C. § 2462 states that:
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or
proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture,
pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced
within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within
the same period, the offender or the property is found within the United
States in order that proper service may be made thereon.260

257. Reid Kress Weisbord & George C. Thomas, III, Judicial Sentencing Error and the Constitution,
96 B.U. L. REV. 1617, 1657 (2016) (footnotes omitted) (first citing GEORGE C. THOMAS III, DOUBLE
JEOPARDY: THE HISTORY, THE LAW 76–79 (1998); then citing DEMOSTHENES, 1 ORATIONS 20.147
(J.H. Vince trans., 1930)).
258. Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 115–
16 (2008).
259. See id. at 124–28; see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31253, STATUTE OF
LIMITATION IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2017).
260. 28 U.S.C. § 2462.
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Criminal denaturalization actions are governed by a ten-year statute of
limitations.261 Civil denaturalization statutes, however, do not contain a parallel
provision that would bar actions after a certain amount of time.262 The Supreme
Court has yet to take up the question of whether the catchall provision should,
however, apply to civil denaturalization. Some lower courts have answered that
question in the negative. In United States v. Rebelo,263 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit stated in an unpublished decision that “a denaturalization
action is not an action seeking the enforcement of a penalty or forfeiture, the
subject matter of Section 2462.”264 Instead, the court argued, “denaturalization
‘is regarded not as punishment but as a necessary part of regulating
naturalization of aliens.’”265 Meanwhile, a district court ruled in United States v.
Wang266 that there was no statute of limitations defense because none was
mentioned in 8 U.S.C. § 1451, which governs the denaturalization
proceeding.267 Another district court followed similar logic.268 The argument in
Wang is none too convincing as the same is true for any civil actions that do not
contain explicit statutes of limitations, which is precisely why the catchall
provision exists.
The question of whether denaturalization is punitive is perhaps a more
difficult call. Historically, the Supreme Court held that it is not, and that it
merely serves to “deprive[] [the defendant] of his ill-gotten privileges”269 and
to “protect the integrity of the naturalization process.”270 During the latter half
of the twentieth century, as the Court became more protective of citizenship, it
maintained that denaturalization was not generally intended to be punitive—
but left open the idea that intent matters, writing that “[d]enaturalization is not
imposed to penalize the alien for having falsified his application for citizenship;
if it were, it would be a punishment.”271
Under the current circumstances, it is impossible to say that
denaturalization is no longer intended as punishment. Both logic and the
261. See 18 U.S.C. § 1425 (defining unlawful naturalization); 18 U.S.C. § 3291 (imposing a tenyear statute of limitations).
262. See (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 405 (“Civil litigation carries a lower burden of
proof, there is no statute of limitations on civil denaturalization, there is no right to a jury trial, and
there is no right to appointed counsel.”).
263. 394 F. App’x 850 (3d Cir. 2010).
264. Id. at 853.
265. Id. (quoting E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1101–02 (3d Cir. 1997)).
266. 404 F. Supp. 2d 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
267. See id. at 1157–58.
268. See United States v. Dhanoa, 402 F. Supp. 3d 296, 300 (D.S.C. 2019) (citing Costello v.
United States, 365 U.S. 265, 283 (1961), for the proposition that Congress could add a statute of
limitations but has chosen not to).
269. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242 (1912).
270. United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374, 1382 (7th Cir. 1986).
271. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98 (1958).
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explicit statements of the Trump administration counsel against adopting their
understanding.272 For one, there is no doubt that denaturalization imposes
significant negative consequences on an individual that can rival incarceration
and be permanent in nature.273 In the modern era, it has been increasingly
recognized that “loss of citizenship renders extraordinarily severe consequences
upon the individual concerned.”274
Furthermore, the words of the DOJ openly belie the idea that
denaturalization is not punitive. When announcing the creation of a new
Denaturalization Section within the DOJ in February 2020, the press release
emphasized that “[t]his move underscores the Department’s commitment to
bring justice to terrorists, war criminals, sex offenders, and other fraudsters who
illegally obtained naturalization.”275 Assistant Attorney General Jody Hunt was
additionally quoted as saying: “The Denaturalization Section will further the
Department’s efforts to pursue those who unlawfully obtained citizenship status
and ensure that they are held accountable for their fraudulent conduct.”276 When
Baljinder Singh was denaturalized in 2018, USCIS Director L. Francis Cissna
stated: “I hope this case, and those to follow, send a loud message that
attempting to fraudulently obtain U.S. citizenship will not be tolerated.”277 This
language of disincentivizing future bad conduct is part and parcel of the
principles behind both criminal and civil punishment measures.278
Given statements of this nature, some of which were made before its
ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2019 decision to
continue treating denaturalization as nonpunitive for statute of limitations
purposes is rather puzzling. In United States v. Phattey,279 the Ninth Circuit
refused to apply the catchall provision of § 2462, stating: “Because the purpose
of denaturalization is to remedy a past fraud by taking back a benefit to which
an alien is not entitled, we conclude it is not a penalty, and the statute of
limitations does not apply.”280 By this logic, it is difficult to envision where
§ 2462 ever would apply because the imposition of any consequence involves
the undoing of a benefit obtained via illegal action.

272. See Trump Administration Civil and Human Rights Rollbacks, supra note 242.
273. See (Un)Civil Denaturalization, supra note 6, at 435.
274. Self-Incrimination Denied, supra note 40, at 426.
275. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affs., supra note 136 (emphasis added).
276. Id. (emphasis added).
277. Press Release, Office of Pub. Affs., Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Secures First
Denaturalization As a Result of Operation Janus (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-secures-first-denaturalization-result-operation-janus [https://perma.cc/JFM8-R652].
278. See generally, e.g., Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN
THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974)
(discussing the calibration of punishments to discourage offenses optimally).
279. 943 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2019).
280. Id. at 1279 (citing Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242–43 (1912)).

99 N.C. L. REV. 1425 (2021)

1468

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99

The Phattey court combats that point by seeking to distinguish the
purposes of sanctions from their effects, arguing that the defendant was
conflating the two.281 The court does this to justify why the Supreme Court
applied § 2462 in Kokesh v. SEC,282 an action involving disgorgement in the
context of federal securities laws violation.283 This distinction is difficult to
square with the explicit statements of the DOJ, which suggest that punishment
is very much the primary goal. Worse, though, the Ninth Circuit quotes the
Supreme Court’s Kokesh decision in an abbreviated manner that leads to
incorrect conclusions: “The Supreme Court has determined that a sanction is a
penalty only if it is sought for the purpose of punishment or deterrence.”284 That
passage in Kokesh, however, reads at greater length: “[A] pecuniary sanction
operates as a penalty only if it is sought for the purpose of punishment, and to
deter others from offending in like manner—as opposed to compensating a victim
for his loss.”285 The Kokesh Court then went on to give examples of the latter in
the form of copyright statutory damages (where both the suit and the recovery
belong to a private plaintiff) and a refund that a railroad company had to
provide to a shipping company for excessive shipping rates, where “[b]ecause
the liability imposed was compensatory and paid entirely to a private plaintiff,
it was not a ‘penalty’ within the meaning of the statute of limitations.”286
When viewed in this light, it becomes clear that the Ninth Circuit’s
rationale for refusing to impose the statute of limitations from § 2462 is deeply
flawed. Denaturalization can in no way be described as compensation to a
private victim—language from Kokesh that the Ninth Circuit chose to omit
would have made clear that instead, denaturalization should be regarded as a
penalty. Providing further support for this proposition, none of the examples
in Kokesh of actions for which § 2462 ought not to apply bear any resemblance
to denaturalization. Instead, they are all actions in which a private citizen
unambiguously compensates another. Thus, the Kokesh Court only offered two
choices: a pecuniary sanction is either used for punishment and general
deterrence, or it is compensation to a private victim. Denaturalization can only
be the former.
Matters may be trickier for cases involving denial that citizenship ever
existed. If the State Department refuses to issue a new U.S. passport to an
individual, this arguably does not constitute an “action” to which the catchall
provision would apply. For those types of cases, courts likely would not be able

281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

See id. at 1283.
137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
See Phattey, 943 F.3d at 1281–83 (citing Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642).
Id. at 1283 (citing Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642).
Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 (emphasis added) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
See id. at 1642–43 (internal citations omitted).
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to find a statute of limitations defense, though they could potentially apply
other doctrines such as equitable estoppel.
2. Equitable Estoppel and Laches
Bridging the values of reliance and finality, the doctrine of equitable
estoppel has a long-standing pedigree in American law. In 1871, the Supreme
Court explained: “The principle is that where one party has by his
representations or his conduct induced the other party to a transaction to give
him an advantage which it would be against equity and good conscience for him
to assert, he would not in a court of justice be permitted to avail himself of that
advantage.”287
Hoda Muthana’s attorneys argued that equitable estoppel should prevent
the government from withdrawing her citizenship rights many years after
issuing her a passport and then renewing it.288 In opposition to the government’s
motion to dismiss, they stated: “The case for estoppel against the government
requires proof of both the traditional elements of the doctrine as well as ‘a
showing of an injustice . . . and lack of undue damage to the public interest.’”289
Further, they explained that “[a] showing of injustice requires a demonstration
that the government and/or its agents ‘engage[d]—by commission or
omission—in misrepresentation or concealment, or, at least, behave[d] in ways
that have or will cause an egregiously unfair result.’”290 The attorneys explained
that the government knew all relevant facts about Muthana’s father’s diplomatic
status when it issued Muthana a passport in 2005, that these actions prevented
Muthana’s father from applying for naturalization for her as he successfully did
for his older children who had not been born in the United States, and that the
government engaged in bad faith when it waited to raise objections until a year
after Muthana left the United States and allegedly associated with ISIS.291
The district court rejected Muthana’s equitable estoppel argument, ruling
that “[c]ourts cannot grant citizenship through their equitable powers.”292 As a
result, the court also decided that it was unable to have the State Department
reissue a U.S. passport to an individual who is not actually a citizen.293 One of
the cases on which the court relied for its decision is Hizam v. Kerry,294 where
287. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 80 U.S. 222, 233 (1871).
288. See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or in
the Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 39–42, Muthana v. Pompeo, No. 1:19-cv00445-RBW (D.D.C. May 10, 2019).
289. Id. at 39–40 (quoting Hertzberg v. Veneman, 273 F. Supp. 2d 67, 83 (D.D.C. 2003).
290. Id. at 40 (quoting Grumman Ohio Corp. v. Dole, 776 F.2d 338, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
291. See id. at 41.
292. Muthana v. Pompeo, No. 19-445 (RBW), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218098, at *36 (D.D.C.
Dec. 9, 2019) (quoting Hizam v. Kerry, 747 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2014)).
293. See id. at *36–37.
294. 747 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2014).
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another individual of Yemeni background was refused a new passport after more
than twenty years of believing he was a U.S. citizen.295 Unlike Hoda Muthana,
the plaintiff Abdo Hizam had no ties to any terrorist organizations—the State
Department had simply made an error in processing while first issuing him
proof of citizenship when he was nine years old and discovered it decades later
when Hizam applied for passports for his children.296 Rejecting the plaintiff’s
equity-based arguments, the Second Circuit stated that “[i]n the citizenship
context, the reliance interest that an individual might have on an administrative
decision is not enough to read retroactive effect into a statute that provides
cancellation authority.”297
The Muthana and Hizam courts’ central reliance on I.N.S. v. Pangilinan298
in their declarations that courts do not have the equitable power to grant
citizenship is, however, misplaced. The Pangilinan case dealt with individuals
who were never granted citizenship in the first place and who wanted the courts
to declare them citizens.299 That is an entirely different predicament from that
of individuals who were told by the government for dozens of years that they
were citizens. The plaintiffs in Muthana and Hizam are thus arguably not asking
the courts to confer citizenship on them, but rather to stop the government from
denying a state of affairs that it had itself created and on which the plaintiffs
reasonably relied.
When roles were reversed, courts did not hesitate to apply equitable
estoppel to bar citizens from benefitting from their own fraud or mistake. In
one case, a plaintiff claimed that her own citizenship had been secured through
her and her husband’s fraud.300 Denaturalization, in this case, would have been
economically valuable: as a non-American Dutch citizen she would be
automatically entitled to a share of her deceased husband’s estate, a benefit she
would not get if she were an American citizen.301 The court concluded that the
widow was equitably estopped from challenging her naturalization; she had
“voluntarily enjoyed the fruits of her citizenship for some 23 years,” the court
pointed out, and she traveled with a U.S. passport, paid state and federal taxes,
and used American consular services while traveling abroad.302 The court was
295. Id. at 104.
296. See id. at 105–06.
297. Id. at 110.
298. 486 U.S. 875 (1988).
299. See id. at 875.
300. Simons v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 855, 858 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff’d, 452 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir.
1971).
301. Id. The Simons court quoted Justice Black’s famous observation that “[n]ot only is United
States citizenship a ‘high privilege,’ it is a priceless treasure.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting)). However, the Simons court distinguished the case before
it, observing that “it seems that the plaintiff here seeks a treasure which she would value more, a share
of her former husband’s substantial estate in which she may have rights under Dutch law.” Id.
302. Id. at 867.
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willing to accept, for the sake of argument, that she had failed to meet the
statutory requirements for naturalization, but was unwilling to allow her to take
advantage of her own fraud by later attacking the validity of her citizenship.303
This was true even though the court acknowledged that there was a public
interest issue in citizenship that went beyond the duplicitous widow, but
concluded that both the widow herself, and the U.S government—which had
appeared to defend the case—were ill-suited to “vindicate the public
interest.”304 The court therefore dismissed the case, and the widow retained her
U.S. citizenship.
But although the widow was equitably estopped from asserting her own
citizenship fraud, the Supreme Court suggested in Fedorenko v. United States305
that courts lack equitable discretion in denaturalization cases.306 The Court
perhaps left room for equitable discretion in other types of cases involving
citizenship status; it stated only that “district courts lack equitable discretion to
refrain from entering a judgment of denaturalization against a naturalized
citizen whose citizenship was procured illegally or by willful misrepresentation
of material facts.”307 At the very least, the holding in Fedorenko could arguably
be limited to cases involving official denaturalization proceedings (as in Singh).
The limitation on equitable discretion need not apply when the government
challenges the original existence of citizenship rights (as in Muthana or Hizam).
So far, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the issue of equitable
estoppel in the context of a case in the citizenship denial category. Further, the
complete change in composition of Supreme Court justices between the
Fedorenko decision in 1981 and today opens the door to revisiting the matter
even for denaturalization cases.
Another equitable defense that individuals have pursued is that of laches.
When a party has let too much time elapse to bring a claim, laches provide a
defense if the party against whom it is asserted showed lack of diligence and if
prejudice would otherwise result to the party asserting it.308 While the doctrine
of laches was historically inapplicable against the government, this has changed
more recently.309 In Hizam, the Second Circuit stated that “[t]he equities in this
case overwhelmingly favor Hizam[, but] . . . [w]ell-settled case law bars a court

303. See id.
304. See id.
305. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
306. Id. at 517.
307. Id.
308. See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281–82 (1961).
309. See generally An Nguyen, Note, It’s About Time: Reconsidering Whether Laches Should Lie Against
the Government, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 2111, 2111 (discussing the growing trend that questions the
assumption that laches cannot be asserted against the government).
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from exercising its equity powers to naturalize citizens.”310 The district court in
Wang had reached the same result, citing to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Costello v. United States.311
Courts have thus generally denied a defense of laches for the same reason
that they have denied one of equitable estoppel. In so doing, they have cited to
the same cases, which issued blanket prohibitions on the use of any equitable
defense. Pangilinan is distinguishable with regard to laches for the same reasons
as for equitable estoppel: the case involved people who had never been told they
were citizens versus, in cases of denaturalization and denial, people who had.
Similarly, Fedorenko could at least be limited to denaturalization instances for
purposes of laches analysis.
3. Time Limits on (Governmental and Other) Appeals
As one of us has stated previously, one of the key ways in which accuracy
ultimately yields to finality is “the universal existence of appellate deadlines.”312
This runs both ways, and neither defendants nor plaintiffs or even governments
can extend that period indefinitely. Citizenship determinations, however, are
not treated like court judgments. Therefore, because there is no statute of
limitations for civil denaturalizations, the government can either deny
citizenship ever existed or officially denaturalize individuals after dozens of
years.313
Even in most general criminal cases, the government only has thirty days
to appeal a judgment—and acquittals cannot be appealed at all.314 If the
government believes that a dangerous individual will be released, its hands are
eventually still tied. The legal system does not allow the government to
continue dragging people through process after process after a certain amount
of time has passed. Proving citizenship, however, has no such end point; issues
310. Hizam v. Kerry, 747 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing I.N.S. v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875,
885 (1988)); Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 517; United States v. Wong Kim Ark., 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898).
In addition to the discussion we provide in the main text about Pangilinan and Fedorenko, it is not at all
obvious that the language in Wong Kim Ark presents a barrier to having equitable defenses protect
citizenship. The Hizam court was presumably referring to the passage that states: “[c]itizenship by
naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law.”
Wong Kim Ark., 169 U.S. at 702. For one, this would not apply to the use of equitable defenses in cases
like Hoda Muthana’s in which the individual was born in the United States. For another, even in cases
of naturalization for those born outside the country, it is not clear that an equitable defense stands
outside the “forms of law.”
311. United States v. Wang, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1158–59 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (citing to Costello,
365 U.S. at 283–84, which held that the doctrine of laches was not available to the defendant as a
defense in his denaturalization proceeding).
312. The Right To Appeal, supra note 255, at 1275.
313. See supra Section IV.B.1.
314. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(1)(B); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 670 (1896) (“If the judgment
is upon an acquittal, the defendant, indeed, will not seek to have it reversed; and the government
cannot.”).
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can arise any time a person seeks to renew a passport or vote in an election.
Citizens can also be swept up unexpectedly in immigration enforcement
proceedings and have to assert their citizenship to defend against removal
proceedings. The government can ask an individual to prove again and again
and again, over any length of years, that the information presented was accurate.
V. UNCONDITIONAL CITIZENSHIP
A spectrum of possible solutions exists to protect citizenship in a manner
more consistent with our foundational principles of government and to align its
treatment with the general values governing our legal system. The feasibility of
each option depends on the level of commitment to these principles of the
relevant reforming body—be it the courts or Congress.
The first set of possibilities involves mechanisms to limit in time the
ability of the government to denaturalize an individual or deny that they have
citizenship through civil mechanisms. This would help to ensure the finality of
citizenship, enable the realization of reliance interests, and at least reduce the
chilling effects after a number of years have passed. For denaturalization, courts
could hold that the federal catchall provision imposes an outer limit on the
government’s ability to challenge someone’s naturalization for any reason.
Alternatively, Congress could pass a law imposing a statute of limitations for
the challenging of both denaturalizations and citizenship denials. In the case of
denaturalizations, the time would run from when naturalization took place. In
the case of denials, it could run from when a U.S. birth certificate or passport
was issued, depending on the circumstances.
A mechanism that would shorten the time and opportunity for the
government to challenge denaturalization specifically—thus clarifying a
person’s status with finality more quickly and reducing chilling effects more
than a multiyear statute of limitations would—is to bind the government’s
ability to challenge citizenship to a brief post-naturalization appeals period.
After someone obtains citizenship, the government would have thirty or sixty
days to challenge USCIS’ determination. This would incentivize USCIS to
investigate applications properly from the start rather than rest easy in the
knowledge that if it misses the existence of fraud, the government can return
any time to take away an individual’s citizenship. Creating such an appeals
period would require congressional action.
Another set of tools at courts’ disposal to protect citizenship in cases of
both denaturalization and denial is that of equitable defenses. One of the
obstacles to judicial intervention is that the courts may first need to fully grasp
the significance and property-like nature of the citizenship interest. A district
court went the other way on this issue in Hizam when it stated that the case
“does not deal with property or contractual rights or set out new criminal
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punishments. Instead, it falls within the citizenship context.”315 As explained
above,316 this view is incorrect, and courts must adjust their understanding
accordingly. Ideally, this would eventually result in the Supreme Court
overturning Fedorenko and allowing equitable defenses to protect citizenship in
relevant cases (with the greater passage of time certainly helping to increase an
individual’s chance of winning their case). Alternatively, courts should at least
clarify that Fedorenko applies only to situations of denaturalization and not of
denial. This would potentially then allow the immediate implementation of
equitable defenses, like equitable estoppel or laches, to cases of citizenship
denial.
The solutions discussed here so far apply to civil processes. Similar
problems arise, however, with criminal denaturalization or criminal law
mechanisms related to citizenship denial. As an example of the latter, an
individual asserting citizenship and applying for a passport could be pursued
for fraud. This could, of course, chill their exercise of the full panoply of
citizenship rights, as is true with fears over criminal denaturalization even if one
did nothing wrong. This could cover any action that an individual perceives as
placing them in the “eye of the authorities.” While criminal denaturalization at
least has a statute of limitations, being criminally pursued for illegitimately
applying for a passport could happen to anyone at any point.
The most clean-cut solution is to eliminate all mechanisms for civil and
criminal denaturalization and for denials of previously recognized citizenship.
This would provide the ultimate protection for citizenship and allow for full
exercise of citizenship rights without chilling effects. It would say that once the
government has naturalized an individual, or given them a U.S. birth certificate
or passport, that individual has truly been accepted into the polity and can enjoy
full rights for perpetuity. The downsides of doing so are minor. Most abuse and
fraud can be weeded out at the front end, as they should be. It is true that a
new, small number of individuals could gain perpetual rights to citizenship
through the changes delineated in this Article—the vast majority of whom will
lead otherwise unremarkable lives in the United States. Nevertheless, this is a
worthwhile price to pay to ensure the rights of so many innocent people who
currently live in fear that an abusive regime could use a completed (or even
attempted) denaturalization or denial process to silence them at any time.
CONCLUSION
U.S. citizens today are not safe from the threats of denaturalization and
citizenship denial. The procedural protections that exist for much lesser rights
are unavailable in the citizenship context, and our current system fails to respect
315. Hizam v. Kerry, 747 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2014).
316. See supra Section IV.B.2.
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the dual values of reliance and finality. The introduction of statutes of
limitations, finite appeals periods, and equitable defenses could all help to
improve the flaws of the civil denaturalization and denial systems. Taking
matters a step further, we should consider eliminating all methods of civil and
criminal denaturalization and denial. It is the only way to help remove any
meaningful legal distinction between different types of citizens, and to take
away from the government tools that enable invidious discrimination.
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